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INTRODUCTION

The federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)'-a malign,
oppressive, and in the view of some writers unconstitutional piece of
work 2-has done American law and government one favor. In its secondary
and tertiary layers of malfeasance this statute, enacted in 1996, puts one in
mind of the Hyde Amendment, 3 another federal enactment that set out to
make a subordinated minority worse off. Just as the Hyde Amendment
started out only by withholding federally funded Medicaid coverage of
abortion, thus nominally complying with the right of self-determination
announced in Roe v. Wade,4 and moved only later to interfering with health

1. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
as amended in 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
2. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234,
248-53 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA violates various provisions of the U.S.
Constitution). On Valentine's Day 2011, the New York Times began an editorial with a
denunciation: "The 1996 Defense of Marriage Act is indefensible--officially sanctioned
discrimination against one group of Americans imposed during an election year." Editorial,
In Defense of Marriage, for All, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, at A26 [hereinafter NYT
Editorial]. Writers have long contended that the statute is unconstitutional as well as
pernicious. See Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battlegroundfor
Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2684, 2695-2707 (2004) (arguing that
DOMA's definition of civil marriage as an "exclusively heterosexual institution" violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution) [hereinafter Litigating]; Mark Strasser,
DOMA and the Two Faces of Federalism, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 457, 474 (1998) ("DOMA
should be struck down because it picks out a disfavored minority for adverse treatment.");
James M. Patten, Comment, The Defense of MarriageAct: How CongressSaid "No " to Full
Faith and Credit, and the Constitution, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 939, 952-57 (1998)
(arguing that DOMA violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Effects Clause of the
U.S. Constitution); Melissa Rothstein, Essay, The Defense of MarriageAct and Federalism:
A States' Rights Argument in Defense of Same-Sex Marriages,31 FAM. L.Q. 571 (1997)
(suggesting that DOMA is unconstitutional under principles of federalism); Larry Kramer,
Same-Sex Marriage,Conflict ofLaws, and the UnconstitutionalPublic Policy Exception, 106
YALE L.J. 1965 (1997) (arguing that the public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is unconstitutional).
3. Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act,
Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).
4. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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care reform,5 DOMA started out by declaring a narrow federal definition of
marriage-a relation that only one man and one woman could share
together-and in this text did not offend against what the Supreme Court
had ruled that same year: disapproval of homosexuality, the Court had said,
may not constitute a basis for state action.6 DOMA also told states that they
were free to use the federal rejection of same-sex marriage in support of a
stance they could take not to recognize same-sex marriages formed in other
states. Soon came a new generation of measures against same-sex marriage
that augmented the oppressions of the federal ancestor: state DOMAs,7 state
constitutional amendments declaring that marriage is between one man and
woman, 8 and destruction of same-sex marriage as it had become law in two
states, California and Maine.9
5. See Editorial, The Two Abortion Wars: A Highly Intrusive Federal Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, at WK7 (lamenting abortion politics related to the Hyde Amendment
as an impediment to health care reform).
6. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
7. See Alliance Defense Fund, DOMA Watch, http://www.domawat
ch.org/index/.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Alliance Defense Fund] ("37 states
have their own Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMAs)."). In addition to these thirty-seven
states, most others also refuse marriage licenses to same-sex couples and do not recognize
same-sex marriage.
8. See Alliance Defense Fund, supra note 7 ("There are 30 states that have
constitutional amendments protecting traditional marriage, including the three states
(Arizona, California, and Florida) that passed constitutional amendments in November
2008."). Utah's marriage amendment reads as follows: "(1) Marriage consists only of the
legal union between a man and a woman. (2) No other domestic union, however
denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent
legal effect." UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29. By comparison, Alaska's is relatively terse: "To be
valid or recognized in this State, a-marriage may exist only between one man and one
woman." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
9. Regarding same-sex marriage, a survey: three states-Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Iowa-have legalized same-sex marriage by way of high court decisions.
See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Kerrigan v. Comm'r
of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
The California Supreme Court recognized a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage in
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). In 2008, however, California voters acted
against the court's decision by approving a measure banning same-sex marriages. Lisa Leff,
California Voters Approve Gay-MarriageBan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 5, 2008, available
at http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D948TRV80&showarticle=l. A federal district
court decision invalidating this ballot measure, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), has been appealed.
Four jurisdictions-the District of Columbia, New Hampshire, New York, and
Vermont-recognize same-sex marriage via statutes enacted without any judicial order to do
so. D.C. COUNCIL 18-482 (2009) (codified at D.C. CODE § 46-401(a) (2010)); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 457-A:1 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 8 (2000); Nicholas Confessore &
Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass
Law (N.Y. TIMES), June 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/nyregion/gaymarriage-approved-by-new-york-senate.html?sq=samesexmarriage&st=cse&adxnnl= 1&scp
=6&adxnnlx=1309795208-PGblVvNGM/YeBD+lcQdjew. Same-sex marriage in Vermont
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Support for same-sex marriage as measured by opinion polls has risen
since the enactment of DOMA, ° and a vibrant civil-rights movement
presses a litigation strategy around the country. As of mid-2011, same-sex
marriages may be performed in six states and the District of Columbia," and
are recognized in a couple of others. 12 In 2010, a well-received decision
held that a ballot initiative declaring same-sex marriage unlawful in
California had, by "singling out gay men and lesbians for denial of a
marriage license," violated the United States Constitution. 3 The 1996
enactment of DOMA, in short, did not deal a death blow to what activists
call marriage equality.
But a favor? My odd-sounding claim is the thesis of this Article: from
the perspective of one who supports making marriage available to same-sex
couples, statutes that purport to defend marriage by restricting it-DOMA
and its state counterparts-have had a useful effect. They can, I argue, be
used to foster more parsimony and transparency concerning what courts call
"the essentials of marriage," a troubling category shrouded in mystery.
As explicated by one scholar, "essentials" are aspects of the marital
state so foundational that "a marriage entered into without them is [deemed]
invalid and the law does not permit a couple to waive or alter these elements

replaced civil unions, a measure required by the Vermont Supreme Court in 1999. Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). Maine was once in this group; in 2009, its legislature
passed a bill providing for same-sex marriage. 2009 ME. LAWS 82. After the governor of
Maine signed the bill, however, through a referendum similar to California's the voters of
Maine made same-sex marriage unavailable. Ros Krasny, Maine Voters Latest to Turn
Down Gay Marriage, REUTERS, Nov. 4, 2009, available at http://www.reu
ters.com/article/idUSTRE5A312020091104.
10. An August 2010 poll conducted by the Associated Press found that 52% of
Americans believed the federal government should give legal recognition to same-sex
marriages, compared with 46% in 2009. The AP-National Constitution Center Poll,
http://surveys.ap.org/data%5CGfK%5CAP-fK%2OPoll%20August%20NCC%20topline.pdf
(last visited Jan. 27, 2011). Another August 2010 poll, by CNN, found that 49% of
Americans answered "yes" when asked whether gays and lesbians have a constitutional right
to get married and have their marriage recognized by law as valid (compared with 45% in
2009). Opinion Research Poll, CNN (Aug. 11, 2010), http://i2.cdn.tumer.com/cnn/2010/ima
ges/08/ 1/rel I Ia.pdf.
11. See supra note 9.
12. See Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153 (Wyo. 2011) (dissolving a samesex marriage formed in Canada by analogizing it to a common law marriage, which also may
be recognized though not formed in Wyoming); Aaron C. Davis & John Wagner, Md. to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriagefrom Other Places, WASH. PosT, Feb. 25, 2010, at Al
(reporting a decision by the Maryland attorney general).
13. Schwarzenegger,704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003; see also Andrew Koppelman, DOMA,
Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REv. 923, 943 (2010) (praising Perry and noting that
"[t]he case against same-sex marriage has become increasingly unintelligible, which
obviously will have implications when courts go looking for a rational basis for laws that
discriminate against gay people").
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by private agreement."' " This Article will pay heed to those essentials that
make a union valid by their presence or invalid by their absence, but puts
more emphasis on obligations that cannot be waived or altered because of
marital status. 5 Although by some measures these essentials are in retreatfewer in number and weaker in force than in past decades-they still
manifest signs of strength and even expansion.
Similar to the way "essentialism" about ethnicity and gender
undermines civil rights reforms, 6 the use of unarticulated beliefs about an
essence to destroy arrangements that spouses make voluntarily to form or
govern their marriage is worrisome. Two problems call for attention. First,
judicial obstructions of private ordering can be understood to clash with a
tradition that upholds privacy within a marriage. From the proclamation
that husbands and wives sleep together in the "sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms"' 7 through doctrines of immunity, nonintervention, and
nonenforcement that prevent individuals from gaining redress for harms
done to them by their spouses, 8 American judges have declared that persons
14. Twila L. Perry, The "Essentials of Marriage": Reconsidering the Duty of
Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8 (2003).
15. One of my goals here is to fill a gap. Extensive decisional law and secondary
writings now expound on the constitutional right to marry, first announced by the Supreme
Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). After Zablocki v. Redhail, which
clarified that the Loving right to marry could invalidate restrictions unrelated to race, scholars
began to study positive laws blocking access to marriage as violations of this right. 434 U.S.
374, 383-84 (1978). Prerogatives of a married couple to make enforceable agreements inter
se or otherwise veer from a unitary legal status, by contrast, have received relatively little
scholarly attention. Case law about the essentials of marriage is extensive, but has not been
gathered and synthesized; analysis and recommendations like those of Twila Perry are rare.
See Perry, supra note 14.
16. "Essentialism is used to connote the idea that things, women, culture, races, have
fixed, innate, and identifiable properties, or essences." Michelle A. McKinley, Cultural
Culprits, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 91, 121-22 (2009). The central writings on
essentialism as an impediment to progress are Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialismin FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
18. The early common law assumption that "the house of every one is to him as his
castle and fortress," Semayne's Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, (K.B.) 195; 5 Co. Rep. 91a,
91 b, underscores the ideals of familial privacy. "The last four decades ... have witnessed
the emergence of a doctrine of state non-intervention in marriage premised on solicitude for
individual autonomy." Milton C. Regan, Jr., Marriageat the Millennium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 647,
655 (2000). Principles of nonintervention have gone so far as to mask domestic physical
abuse. Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our
Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY: REv. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL
ISSUES 63, 71 (1991) (referencing the nonintervention by law to aid women victimized by
their husbands); see generally Darren Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A
Law & Economics Defense of Same-Sex Marriage, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 115, 116-17
(2001) (noting the inconsistency of theorists in law and economics who favor
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married to each other share a bond powerful enough to supersede laws of
general application. At the same time, judges rely on marital privacy to
hold that these individuals may not write rules or terms to govern their
relationship when their provisions contradict a notion of essentials-a roster
that spouses who wonder about what they may bargain for cannot look up in
any government-published rulebook. 9 The association between marital
privacy and state-of-nature lawlessness is familiar enough.2 ° It remains
perverse, however, to use privacy to deny or nullify the arrangements that a
couple makes to govern its shared life.
The second difficulty-less familiar than marital privacy, but more
central to my purpose-is that whenever the law declares that a couple may
not "waive or alter" essentials by their initiative or "private agreement,"'" it
gets in the way of private ordering, and that kind of obstruction by the state
calls for parsimony and transparency now lacking in the essentials of
marriage. In another context, I have had occasion to quote Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.: "'State interference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a
good."' 22 Certainly the law may stand in the way of what people pursue via
bilateral agreement. That courts will refuse to enforce contracts containing
extreme terms-the enslavement of individuals, the sale of babies or human
limbs, promises to kill someone, and so on-is a truism.23 A deal between
individuals can even be unenforceable in court on the ground that it offends
the United States Constitution. 4

nonintervention in heterosexual marriage based on freedom of contract while condoning
government intervention against same-sex marriage).
19.
20.

See infra Parts I, II (giving examples of Essentials).
See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:

LIFE AND LAW

DISCOURSES ON

96-97, 101 (1987) (arguing that marital privacy shelters men who abuse

women); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal

Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (expounding on the law's refusal to recognize family
members as individuals who negotiate with, make trades with, and have claims against one
another).
21. Perry, supra note 14, at 8.
22. Anita Bernstein, The Representational Dialectic (With Illustrations from
Obscenity, Forfeiture,and Accident Law), 87 CAL. L. REV. 305, 312 (1999) (quoting OLIVER

96 (1881)).
23. "In thousands of cases contracts have been declared to be illegal on the ground
that they are contrary to public policy." 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW

1375 (1962); see also Cynthia Fruchtman, Considerations in Surrogacy Contracts, 21
WHITrIER

L.

REV.

429, 431 (2000) (describing refusals to enforce surrogacy contracts);

William Bennett Turner, News Media Liability for "Tortious Interference" with a Source's

Nondisclosure Contract, 14 COMM.

LAW.

13, 13-14 (1996) (analyzing contracts that prohibit

disclosure of prosecutable crimes).
24. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See generally Mark D. Rosen, Was
Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 470-83

(2007) (reviewing critically the literature about this decision).
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Because interferences by governments come at the expense of liberty,
however,25 the law is expected to proceed with care before imposing them.
This Article commends as "parsimony" the inclination on the part of the
state actors to keep their infringements to a minimum. State-imposed
interferences also ought to be transparent-intelligible, comprehensible,
clearly worded, and accessible-to individuals.26 Applying parsimony in
this realm honors what Robert Mnookin, in a defense of private ordering for
divorce, has called "[t]he liberal ideal that individuals have fundamental
rights, and should freely choose to make of their lives what they wish."27
Applying transparency means that persons who contemplate embarking on a
marriage, or modifying the terms that will govern them in an ongoing
marital relationship, will know better in advance how the law can impede
bargains that they make. 8
For generations, courts would use essentials in a venerable rejoinder to
private ordering: Because we said so. Neither transparent nor parsimonious,
this judicial stance regarded sexual intimacy as a source of both emotional
upheaval and new dependents. Sex, in this view, throws unruly Nature into
the bargains that individuals write and try to impose on themselves,
upending the order that they plan. The state purported to have no choice

25. Elsewhere I expand on this point using controversies over tort reform as an
illustration. Anita Bernstein, The 2x2 Matrix of Tort Reform's Distributions,60 DE PAUL L.
REV. 273, 273-74 (2011).
26. See generally 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, Essay on the Promulgation of Laws, and the
Reasons Thereof in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 157 (William Tait ed., 1843) (arguing

that the state ought to present the law "to the minds of those who are to be governed by it in
such manner as that they may have it habitually in their memories, and may possess every
facility for consulting it"). For writings that extol transparency in government action while
also noting countervailing goals, see Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377,
386-87 (2009) (reviewing Internet censorship as practiced by national governments);
Kenneth Feinberg, Transparency and Civil Justice: The Internal and External Value of
Sunlight, 58 DE PAUL L. REV. 473, 474-75 (2009) (recounting public scrutiny of, and

participation in, the federal 9/11 compensation scheme); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities
and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197,

1199 (1999) (considering transparency in SEC rulemaking).
27. Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining:The Limits on Private Ordering,18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1015, 1018 (1985).

28.

Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:

Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 502 (1998) (arguing that "the law

should lift the veil of ignorance shrouding marriage").
29. For Kant, adherence to the Categorical Imperative dictates that "[slexual union
in accordance with law is marriage (matrimonium), that is, the union of two persons of
different sexes for lifelong possession of each other's sexual attributes." IMMANUEL KANT,
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 62 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996). Contemporary marriage and
behavior challenge this austerity. GREG MARC NIELSEN, THE NoRMS OF
ANSWERABILITY: SOCIAL THEORY BETWEEN BAKHTIN AND HABERMAS 111 (2002) ("One of
sexual

the most obvious changes that distances us from Kant's discussion of action and Eros is that
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but to step in. Today, even with "family planning" perceived as an
attainable pursuit (rather than an oxymoron), and personal status as a parent
(or not) often referred to as a choice, ° the essentials of marriage retain their
potential to destroy a deal that couples strike, regardless of whether children
or other vulnerable third parties are harmed by their bargain. Because we
say so. Courts have thus built an agent of destruction. To the extent that
"the essentials" connotes enduring reality that cannot be altered, the term is
a misnomer; participants in the marital relation cannot count on courts'
finding this condition implicated in their bargains. In recognition of a
Frankensteinian power, I use the shift key of my keyboard to describe an
agent that has no principal and answers to nobody.
Uncatalogued, judge-made yet not judge-controlled, influenced by
religious antecedents in an ostensibly secular legal system yet beholden to
no creed," the Essentials of Marriage roam unleashed through decisional
and statutory law. DOMA and its state counterparts, by putting another
Essential into legislation, serve to buttress what might have been a
dwindling remnant of the common law. Litigants, judges, and legislatures
invoke Essentials hoping to impose order, but the concept generates havoc
instead. Its havoc derives from uncertainty.
This Article begins with the first inventory of the Essentials that preclude enforceable agreement to form and govern marriages.32 Lacking a
fixed template or rules for inclusion,33 a gatherer has to seek the Essentials
of Marriage by ad hoc methods and criteria. Grounds for annulment may be
the most fundamental source. If a condition demonstrates to the satisfaction
of a court that a marriage never existed, one may infer that the condition
references the Essentials of Marriage.34 Fault-based grounds for divorce add
the legal consensus he had in mind is no longer held as a universal criterion for entering into
sexual relations.").
30. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926-27 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Jennie Bristow, Commentary: Family Planning Should Mean
Choice, Not Control, ABORTION REV., Mar. 25, 2010, available at http:/www.
abortionreview.org/index.php/site/article/716/.
31. See infra Section III.B.
32. I used the same method when studying what American courts call the economic
loss rule, a torts concept that denies recourse for financial losses that result from negligence.
See Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure
Economic Loss, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 773, 782-93 (2006).
33. Perry, supra note 14, at 8 ("There is no finite list of the essential elements and
duties of marriage.").
34. The majority rule in the U.S. is that for an annulment based on
misrepresentation, the withheld or lied-about condition must implicate the essentials of
marriage. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1625, 1680 (2007). New York is a leader among the states that follow a more lenient
"materiality" criterion, but even this tolerant standard demands that the fraud be "vital" to the
relationship. Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff, 104 N.E.2d 877, 880 (N.Y.
1952).
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to the inventory. Not every fault ground implicates the Essentials: for
example, I would exclude cruelty in the belief that a petitioning or plaintiff
spouse who proves that the respondent or defendant spouse behaved in a
wrongful and hurtful manner has established, without reference to
Essentials, her or his entitlement to relief in the form of dissolution: faulty
conduct that causes harm has long provided a basis for state action under the
law of crimes and torts. Adultery and desertion, however, do implicate
Essentials of Marriage, because they enforce entitlements held by the
petitioning spouse-sexual exclusivity and ongoing intimate contact,
respectively-where the respondent's conduct would not generate a legal
claim for relief in any context other than a marriage. A major source of
Essentials of Marriage for this Article is judge-made law invalidating
intraspousal agreements. When a husband and wife may not create a
particular kind of enforceable bargain, it becomes plausible to conclude that
the terms they want violate an Essential.35 The criteria for forming a
common law marriage (especially over the protests of a respondent) provide
another Essentials of Marriage indicator.36
My catalogue of the Essentials of Marriage builds on two recent works
by Mae Kuykendall. In an article co-authored with Adam Candeub,
Kuykendall has contended that individuals in the United States ought to be
able to form marriages according to the law of a jurisdiction in which they
are not physically present at the time of their ceremony. 7 Candeub and
Kuykendall gather precedents that mark their idea as familiar rather than
alien to American law.38 Their choice is a wise tactic for any activist: law
reform proposals are more likely to succeed when their proponents can

35.

The Restatement of Contracts stands up forthrightly for the Essentials of

Marriage. In a section captioned "Promise Detrimental to the Marriage Relationship," it
declares that "a promise by a person contemplating marriage or by a married person" is
unenforceable "if it would change some essential incident of the marital relationship in a way
detrimental to the public interest in the marriage relationship." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 190 (1) (1981).

36. Because parsimony and transparency pertain to freedom, in this Article I
consider only those Essentials that individuals have protested as unjust constraints on their
prerogatives. Focusing on freedom for individuals eliminates from the Article two
Essentials, the barriers based on (1) age and (2) incest. The Essentials of Marriage as
codified in statutory law do prevent children and members of an existing family from
forming a new marriage, but few individuals have complained in the courts about this
constraint. And because I am interested in impediments to bilateral agreements, this Article
passes over the Essential that limits marriage to two people at a time. See generally
Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargainingfor

Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1986-93 (2010) (observing that individuals in dyadic
relationships form agreements differently from individuals in plural relationships).
37..

-

Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U.

REFORM 735 (2011).
38. Id.

MICH.

J.L.
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describe them truthfully as not radical.39 In a companion piece, moving
from activism to analytics, Kuykendall applies "constitutional
considerations" to evaluate the Candeub-Kuykendall proposal;4" I borrow
the constitutional-considerations device later in this Article.4
Fresh thinking about the law of marriage takes the familiar and
examines it as a source of honest puzzlement. Readers must commend
Candeub and Kuykendall for having found yet another Essential that calls
for scrutiny and can inform understanding of the law. In posing a new
question-that is, why do governments demand that couples show up inside
their geographic perimeter in order to form a marriage governed by the law
of that state when they make no such demand on individuals who pursue
other ends, notably persons who write business documents expressing their
wish to be governed by the law of the jurisdiction? Why not offer marriage
licenses to persons located out of state?--Candeub and Kuykendall have
honed in on an overlooked Essential that, like Essentials generally, is
inadequately theorized, a threat to the liberty of individuals, and obscure.
Obscurity will frequently mark an Essential. States do not publish or
declare many of the prohibitions they enforce, and this stance pertains to
their policy of denying marriage licenses to couples who marry in distant
ceremonies. State actors do not account for their decision to thwart. No
records of debate or dialogue about the issue can inform the persons
affected.
In this Article, the unavailability of electronic marriage joins other
instances of parsimony and transparency withheld from persons who have
married or who wish to alter their marital status. My emphasis is on
unjustified impediments that burden individuals rather than on theory or
policy advocacy, although theory and policy advocacy arise here on
occasion. I share the project of inclusion that informs the presentation of
electronic marriage, but whereas Candeub and Kuykendall situate this
method of marrying among other noncontroversial accommodations offered
to persons and entities located outside a jurisdiction,42 this Article situates it
among other examples of marriage-regulating rules as arbitrary (or nonparsimonious) and opaque (or non-transparent) impediments to the freedom
of individuals who have come together to form a married couple.

39. See generally Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes,75
TEX. L. REV. 1539 (1997) (contrasting successful with failed efforts by scholars to propose
new causes of action in tort). The precedent that Candeub and Kuykendall use to particularly
good effect is proxy marriage, available in five states. See Candeub & Kuykendall, supra
note 37, at 742 n.25.
Ceremonial
Marriage:
Constitutional
40. Mae
Kuykendall,
Exporting
Considerations (2011) (unpublished manuscript).
41. See infra Section IlI.C.
42. Candeub & Kuykendall, supranote 37.
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Bringing parsimony and transparency to the Essentials of Marriage
joins a larger project underway for more than a century and a half in
American law: the undoing of coverture. Interference with prerogatives
based on the marital status of individuals originates in the common law
precept that during a marriage "the very being or legal existence of the wife
is suspended."43 American jurisdictions started to undo coverture with the
passage of Married Women's Property Acts in the mid-nineteenth century.'
Courts joined legislatures in this reform. Equal protection arguments
invalidated some marriage-related disabilities,4" while other stances against
coverture in American courts, such as the elimination of intraspousal tort
immunity and the enforceability of antenuptial agreements, emerged
gradually and diffusely in state decisional law.46
Although no judge or legislator today will hew to the proclamation of
Blackstone that "a man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into
covenant with her: for the grant would be to suppose her separate
existence,"4 7 the Essentials of Marriage still force variations on that
prohibition upon individuals. Persons in the United States certainly may
"grant anything" to their spouses, but they cannot depend on the law to
uphold and enforce the spousal bargains they strike. Americans were not
permitted to "enter into [a marital] covenant" with persons of the same sex
even when no governing statute barred their union; today, thwarted by
Essentials that impose gender dimorphism without saying why, most people
in the United States still have no access to same-sex marriage.48
43.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430 (The

University Chicago Press 2002) (1765-1769).
44.

See Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO.

L.J. 1359 (1983).
45. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (invalidating a
Louisiana statute that established the husband as "head and master" of the marital
community, the last of its kind in the U.S.); Samuel v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp.
1119, 1131-34 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (holding that a financial aid rule identifying married women
students' state of residence as that of their husband, regardless of what these students wanted,
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); see also infra Section III.C. 1.
46. Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450, 467 (Md. 2003) (reviewing history of the
abolition of tort immunity); Uniform Premarital Agreement Act § 6, 9C U.L.A. 35 (2001)
(providing for the enforceability of antenuptial agreements in very broad terms); AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.04 (2002) (approving
of antenuptial agreements but adding both substantive and procedural requirements for their
enforceability).
47.
BLACKSTONE, supranote 43, at 430.
48. Understanding the reasons for enforced gender dimorphism is, in my opinion,
necessary to making same-sex marriage available in the United States. Reformers cannot
bypass that step. Take for example an editorial in favor of repealing DOMA. See NYT
Editorial,supra note 2. Its writer contended that Congress moved against recognition of
same-sex marriage out of bigotry and election-year pandering. Id That motive may explain
the enactment of DOMA, but not the prohibitions of same-sex marriage that prevailed before
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Contemporary regulation of marriage is much less oppressive than what
Blackstone described in the eighteenth century,49 and in some ways it is
more parsimonious and transparent."
Lingering interferences and
obscurities rooted in coverture persist, however, and the Essentials of
Marriage continue to impede freedom. 1
Parsimony and transparency in the Essentials of Marriage do not, in
this Article, demand the end of Essentials altogether. If marriage is to
remain a status-a legal reality that I have defended, although my defense
was thin52-then it will necessarily impose results that differ from what
private prerogatives and ordering would assert. Interference in the designs
of individuals is what Status does and will continue to do. "The [s]tate of
[m]arriage and the [s]tate in [m]arriage,"53 however, must also attend to the
liberties of individuals.
I. "ESSENTIALS" AS NON-NEGOTIABLE MARITAL TERMS:
A COMMON LAW CATALOGUE

Here we review aspects of the marital state that the law has deemed
non-negotiable.

1996. See infra Section II.B. Should Congress heed the editorial and repeal the statute, the
availability of same-sex marriage around the country would not necessarily increase. Only
clarity about the demand for gender dimorphism-transparency--can generate more
restraint, or parsimony, in its application.
49. See generally Jana B. Singer, The Privatizationof Family Law, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 1443, 1458-59 (1992) (noting a "demise of the state-imposed marriage contract").
50. Not in all ways, however. Consider breach of promise to marry, a common law
cause of action. A handful of states retain it; most abolished it during a law reform era in the
1930s. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 111-12 (4th ed. 2010). Whether this statutory rejection provides an
illustration of parsimony by the state-whether individuals are freer with or without a
remedy for this breached promise, in other words-is debatable. But current law undeniably
lacks transparency. With respect to promises of marriage, the United States now contains (1)
a common law doctrine (2) repeal of this doctrine by statutes in most but not all states (3)
statutory limitations that burden plaintiffs in most states that have kept the cause of action
and (4) vestiges of the doctrine in jurisdictions that have abolished it. See id. at 116-17
(reviewing judge-made law on gifts "in contemplation of marriage," which deems the
conveying of an engagement ring a conditional or inchoate gift rather than a completed inter
vivos transfer).
51. Cf Brian W. Bix, Domestic Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1753, 1771 (2007)
("I think we need to find more room for enforceable agreements in family law, to understand
the circumstances where no significant public interests are threatened.").
52. Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage:A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129
(2003).
53. Mary Lyndon Shanley, The State of Marriageand the State in Marriage: What
Must Be Done, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 188 (Anita

Bernstein ed., 2006).
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A. Services
According to one pertinent judicial definition of the word, "services"
refers to "domestic affairs which pertain to the comfort, care, and wellbeing" of a spouse.54 Judges applying the common law understood these
"domestic affairs" as central to the marital bargain: wives perform services
and husbands take what their wives render.5 Like some other Essentials,
the obligation of a wife to give services and the entitlement of a husband to
receive them has emerged more through claims brought by third parties than
intramarital disputes. 6
Consortium, the common-law claim for services that were diminished
or made unavailable to a husband after a tortfeasor injured his wife,
generated numerous judicial recitations of actionable losses that the
husband-plaintiff suffered.57 Blackstone said why he thought wives had no
actionable rights to consortium:
[T]he inferior bath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the
superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior: and, therefore, the

54. Ritchie v. White, 35 S.E. 2d 414, 416-17 (N.C. 1945). The Ritchie court
included the care and comfort of children in this understanding of "services," but seemed to
regard the paterfamilias as among the recipients of these attentions rendered to children. Id.
55. Jennifer Wriggins, MarriageLaw and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence,
and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 281 (2000) ("[A]t common law, the
wife owed a duty to provide companionship and services to the husband, but the husband
owed no such duty to the wife.").
56. As Roscoe Pound observed almost a century ago, this indirect enforcement of
family law rights and obligations derived from coverture: when a wife lacked property rights,
she could not assert a claim against her husband. Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the
Domestic Relation, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 188, 195 (1916) (also noting obsolescence of
coverture as a doctrine). Intramarital disputes did generate some decisional law that made
reference to the services that wives owe husbands as part of their marital bargain. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Lewis, 245 S.W. 509, 511 (1922) (noting that although a wife "may have performed
great services" working in her husband's general store, she could not receive any
compensation for that work, because "the store belonged to the husband, and her assistance
in the store was as a member of the family without pay or expectation of reward save to aid
the husband in making a living for the family, including their 11 children.").
57. See Deems v. W. Md. .Ry. Co., 231 A.2d 514, 517 (Md. 1967) ("The loss of
consortium, as used in the cases in Maryland and elsewhere, means the loss of society,
affection, assistance and conjugal fellowship. It includes the loss or impairment of sexual
relations."); Gahagan v. Church, 132 N.E. 357, 357 (Mass. 1921) ("The plaintiff s action is
based on loss of consortium-that is, his right to the society, conjugal affections and
assistance of his wife."); Odom v. Claibome Elec. Coop., Inc., 623 So. 2d 217, 226 (La. App.
1993) ("The claim for loss of consortium is broken down into several components including
loss of: (1) love and affection, (2) society and companionship, (3) sexual relations, (4) the
right of performance of material services, (5) the right of support, (6) aid and assistance, and
(7) felicity.") (citation omitted).
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damages ...for she
inferior, can suffer no loss or injury. The wife cannot recover
58
hath no separate interest in anything, during her coverture.

Starting in the middle of the twentieth century, American courts
rejected the rigid common-law gender divide and began to enforce parity for
husbands and wives who brought consortium claims. 9 Judges also widened
the old focus on lost toil in favor of a more capacious attention to "various
intangibles, usually described as services, society, and sexual intercourse. " '
Tellingly, however, "services" remains on the list of what a plaintiff-spouse
has lost due to the tortious conduct of the defendant.6 In its move toward
more gender equality, the common law could have shifted to a view "that
neither spouse had a duty to provide such services and companionship to
the other, but it did not."62

As a venerable Essential of Marriage, the wifely duty to render
services slipped into the relationship of two individuals named Hildegarde
Lee and Michael Borelli, who were parents and separate property-holders
when they married in April 1984.63 The day before they married, the couple
signed an antenuptial contract keeping their. property separate; and the
California courts never questioned that agreement.' No Essentials in the
way for our modem couple so far. But a postnuptial contract they executed
fell under the Essentials shadow.
The Court of Appeal refused to enforce a deal that the spouses had
made in October 1988, a few months before Michael died. Michael had told
Hildegarde that he strongly desired not to move to a nursing home, "even
though . . . he would need round-the-clock care, and rehabilitative

modifications to the house, in order for him to live at home."65 Hildegarde
and Michael reached an agreement in which Michael promised to bequeath
58. Julian E. Hammar, Note, Breaking the Age Barrierin Alaska: Including Adult
Children in Loss of Filial Consortium Actions, 12 ALASKA L. REv. 73, 78 n.12 (1995)
(quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 143 (1758)).
59. The groundbreaking decision was Hitaffer v. Argonne, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
60. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 842 (2000).
61. Case law issued after the 2000 publication of the Dobbs treatise, see supra note
60, has continued to include "services" in what a spouse may recover in a consortium or
wrongful death claim. See Martin v. Ohio County Hosp. Corp. 295 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Ky.
2009); Thorn v. Mercy Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 761 N.W. 2d 414, 414 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008);
Reeder v. Allport, 218 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. App. 2007).
62. Wriggins, supra note 55, at 281.
63. Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. Ct. App, 647, 649-50 (1993).
64. The American Law Institute has suggested that a person presented with an
antenuptial contract needs more time to think it over and obtain advice. PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.04 (2002) (providing for a rebuttable presumption that
informed consent existed when, inter alia, the agreement was executed at least 30 days before
the marriage).
65. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
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an extensive list of properties to Hildegarde and in exchange Hildegarde
would care for Michael at home.' "Appellant performed her promise but
the decedent did not perform his," wrote the court, before going on to hold
that the contract was void for lack of consideration: Hildegarde had owed
Michael domestic services anyway.67 By agreeing to care for him at home
and thereby "avoiding the need for him to move to a rest home or
convalescent hospital as his doctors recommended," she by the couple's
contract had given her husband nothing to which he was not already
entitled.68
To reach this decision, the California Court of Appeal relied on two
precedents. In re Sonnicksen's Estate refused to enforce a premarital
contact that contained the following bargain: upon his death the man would
convey a particular piece of real property to a woman if the woman had
fulfilled her end of the exchange, which was to render "such
companionship, care and nursing as may be required by [the man], and
during such period to refrain from engaging in her nursing profession for
the purpose of providing for the [man] the greater companionship and
society" that he wanted.69 No deal, said the court, because after forming
their contract, the man and the woman married, and "one of the implied
terms of the contract of marriage was that appellant would perform without
compensation the services covered by said written agreement."7 Tant pis
for you, Martha Sonnicksen, said the court. Essentials of Marriage outrank
what you negotiated.
The wife in Brooks v. Brooks was less sympathetic than Hildegarde
Borelli and Martha Sonnicksen-according to the court, she had been
working as the husband's nurse when she told him she would leave his
home if he did not marry her, and before he died she moved out of his house
against his will-but she encountered the same ratio decidendi when she too
lost her case." The court held that Bessie Brooks had
entered into an agreement to render services which she was bound to render as
being incidental to her marital status with plaintiff and that the sums paid to her by
plaintiff were for such services and that, since such an agreement is void as against
public policy, there was no consideration for the sums of money which
plaintiff
72
paid defendant and he was entitled to bring an action to recover them.
Older cases outside California, surveyed in a Borelli dissent, also held
that toiling wives could not claim compensation for the services they had
66.

Id.at 17-18.

67.
68.

Id.
at 18.
Id.

69.

73 P.2d 643, 644-45 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937).

70.

Id. at 645.

71.

119 P.2d 970, 971 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941).

72.

Id.
at 972-73.
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rendered pursuant to what they thought was an agreement. 3 After an
elderly widower had offered marriage to a woman, proposing that she
"nurse, care, and work for him for the remainder of his natural life" in
exchange for property that he would convey to her in his will, and after the
woman accepted this proposal and performed her part of the bargain, the
Iowa Supreme Court refused to remedy the man's failure to honor his
promise on the ground of no consideration: "There is nothing in the petition
to indicate that the work [the wife] was to do was other than the ordinary
work of a housewife."74 Earlier, the New York Court of Appeals had
reached the same conclusion: "A man cannot be entitled to the services of
his wife for nothing, by virtue of a uniform and unchangeable marriage
contract, and at the same time be under obligation to pay her for those
services."75 Because "a uniform and unchangeable marriage contract"
entitles husbands to receive services from their wives "for nothing," this
husband's volunteering to pay for the services he received was a gratuitous
promise that the court would not enforce.76
Judges and other lawmakers could have put this Essentials conclusion
about services to different uses. A legal system might undertake to
compensate wives for ascribed labor they contribute, or include it in
calculations of the national gross domestic product, or factor it explicitly
into an entitlement for maintenance or property distribution following
divorce. Instead, writes Marjorie Schultz, "contracts doctrine views
everything that women do and value as donative or illusory, as being a
moral obligation or a pre-existing legal duty, or as being in some other way
noncognizable and unenforceable."77 When they declare a pre-existing duty
to give away domestic services without compensation and use this doctrine
to thwart and nullify intraspousal agreements, giving husbands but not
wives the benefit of the bargain, courts that invoke this Essential of
Marriage impose a material detriment on women.
B. Support
The duty of support, frequently linked with the Essential of Marriage
that obliges a married person to deliver services to her spouse, by tradition
burdened husbands and not wives. When they were disabled by coverture,
wives could not enforce the duty of support in court. Instead, third parties
enforced the duty through the doctrine of necessaries, which obliged
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
Careers,77

Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (Poche, J., dissenting).
Bohanan v. Maxwell, 181 N.W. 683, 685 (Iowa 1921).
In re Callister's Estate, 47 N.E. 268, 270 (1897).
Id.
Marjorie Maguire Schultz, The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts and
IowA L. REv. 55, 64 (1991) (attributing the point to a student).
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husbands to pay merchants for the goods that they had supplied to wives, if
those goods were necessary to life."8 The doctrine of necessaries has
survived; courts impose it on both husbands and wives. Almost all the
contemporary necessaries cases involve the furnishing of medical services:
courts today apply the duty of support to require spouses to pay medical
bills.79
Older case law contains more sweeping rhetoric about this duty. In
Van Koten v. Van Koten, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court posited a
role for the government in enforcing this Essential.8" The court declared
that husbands and wives do not form enforceable bilateral contracts.
Instead, the agreement is trilateral: "Marriage is a civil contract to which
there are three parties-the husband, the wife and the [S]tate."' The State
is present at the time of enforcement and must acquiesce in the deal. "One
of the contractual obligations of the marriage contract is the duty of the
husband to support the wife, and this contractual obligation cannot be
abrogated without the consent of the third party, the [S]tate."82
Seeking to nullify the deal she had struck, Ida Van Koten accused her
husband of fraud in the formation of a contract, but did not dispute that she
had received consideration in exchange for what she gave up when she and
her husband decided to separate.83 The Van Koten separation contract gave
her $3000 in cash and all the possessions inside the marital home.84
Pursuant to the contract, Clifford Van Koten also paid the household bills
that were outstanding and agreed to pay Ida $20 on the first of every month
to support of the couple's daughter; he honored his bargain. 5
Like the California Court of Appeal in Borelli,86 the Illinois Supreme
Court chose not to modify a spousal contract to ameliorate the plight of a
vulnerable spouse, a form of intervention familiar to family law that it might
have been able to justify. Nor did the Illinois court entertain the plaintiff s
accusations of fraud. It simply jettisoned the contract. Neither Van Koten
78. CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW:
PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, AND PERSPECTIVES 294 (2d ed. 2000).
79.
80.

Perry, supra note 14, at 12-13 (citations omitted).
154 N.E. 146 (Ill. 1926).

81.

Id. at 147. For other recitations of the same contention, see Posner v. Posner,

233 So. 2d 381 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'don other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972) (stating

that "in every divorce suit the state is a third party whose interests take precedence over the
private interests of the spouses"); Adams v. Palmer,51 Me. 480, 483 (1863) (observing that

marriages begin with a contract, but once the marital relation is established, "the power of
the parties ... is at an end. Their rights under it are determined by the will of the sovereign
as evidenced by law.").
82. Van Koten, 154 N.E. at 147.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
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nor Borelli denied that the spouse-litigants had put thought into their deal,
expressed wishes to each other, and executed a transaction for mutual
benefit. The meeting of their minds and their exchange of consideration did
not matter. Essentials-the services that Hildegarde Borelli had to render
without the compensation she thought she had earned, the support that
Clifford van Koten owed his wife even after he had given her money and
personal property in lieu of that support-outweighed and displaced the law
of contracts with no judicial statement about the circumstances that
precluded enforcement.
In another notorious decision that came out against a husband, a
federal court applying Michigan law invalidated an agreement between a
husband and a wife whereby the wife would pay the husband three hundred
dollars a month "until the parties hereto no longer desire this arrangement to
continue."87 The contract recited no consideration, but when the parties
divorced, the husband brought an action for back payments owed, alleging
that his wife had in the deal sought to pay him to quit his job and be
available as a travel companion to her.8" One of the grounds that the court
invoked to support its ruling was the husband's duty of support. Any
contract between a husband and wife that relieves the husband of that duty
is void, said the court, and "if the husband can always call upon his wife for
payments of $300 per month he is in practical effect getting rid of his
obligation to support his wife."89
As with the duty to render services, a reader might question whether
elderly case law on the duty of support has any relevance to contemporary
law and policy about the Essentials of Marriage, outside of the relatively
narrow issue of necessaries as applied to medical expenses.9" The answer is
yes, because maintenance following divorce (also ,known as alimony)
remains available, and the duty to pay maintenance post-divorce
maintenance originated in the duty of support." Without a duty of support,
maintenance lacks a justificatory theory.
The list of seven explanations for maintenance gathered by one court92
87.

Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 936 (E.D. Mich. 1940).

88. Id. at 936-37.
89. Id. at 939.
90. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text (exploring the same point with
respect to the Essential of domicile).
91.
alimony).

See Mani v. Mani, 869 A.2d 904, 908-10 (N.J. 2005) (reviewing the history of

92. Id. at 909-10 (offering these explanations for maintenance: [(1)] as damages for
breach of the marriage contract; [(2)] as a share of the benefits of the marriage partnership;
[(3)] as damages for economic dislocation; . . . [(4)] as damages for personal dislocation
(foregoing the chance to marry another); [(5)] as compensation for certain specific losses at
the time of the dissolution; [(6)] as deterrence or punishment for marital indiscretion; and
[(7)] as avoidance of a drain on the public fisc.) (internal citations omitted).

The "Essentialsof Marriage"

does not include an array of other contentions in scholarship.93 Some or all
of these explanations may be accurate; all rest on an anterior obligation of a
husband to support his wife during his marriage. Absent a duty of support
within marriage, the notion that one adult should make transfer payments to
another adult and receive nothing in return would be hard for modems to
imagine.
C. Perdurability
Another Essential of Marriage provides that the union must be
relatively hard to exit. Persons married to each other must manifest their
commitment to what Marjorie Maguire Schultz has called "intended marital
permanence,"94 or what might be shortened to perdurability. Agreements
between spouses that their marriage will exist only for a limited duration, or
was undertaken temporarily for the purpose of "legitimizing" a child, are
unenforceable; courts held steadfast to this stance both before and after the
onset of no-fault divorce.95 The perdurability Essential also enjoys support
in the Restatement of Contracts and among scholars who write on the law of
marriage."
In addition to rejecting attempts by married persons to characterize
their legal union as temporary rather than permanent, American law
enforced the perdurability Essential by making divorce hard to obtain.
After the abolition of legislative divorce in the nineteenth century, judges
and legislators formed criteria for divorce that kept marriages intact unless
one spouse could prove wrongdoing by the other.97 The pre-1970
position-that divorce could be obtained only on a showing of fault-rested
on a premise that no-fault divorce would make quitting a marriage too easy;
93.

See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellmann, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 42-43

(1989) (arguing that alimony gives wives a return on their marital investment); Cynthia Lee
Starnes,

Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-Parenting

Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (contending that mothers who have
physical custody of children after divorce have a claim on their ex-husbands' income, to
compensate them for the costs of childrearing work).
94. Marjorie Maguire Schultz, ContractualOrderingof Marriage:A New Model for
State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 273 (1982).

95. Id.at 273 n. 244 (citations omitted).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190(2) (1981) ("A promise that
tends unreasonably to encourage divorce or separation is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy."); E. Christian Brugger, The Jurisprudence of Marriage and Other Intimate
Relationships, 55 AM. J. JURISP. 225, 226 (2010) (Book Review) (noting that although
contributors to a volume on marriage hold a diverse range of views, they all "do agree on one
thing, namely, that the law should not formalize unions-designate them as marriages-that
are not entered into with the presumption of permanence"). But see id. at 228 (reporting that
one chapter proposes that the state offer two types of marriage, revocable and irrevocable).
97. Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before
No-Fault,86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1501 (2000).
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explanations of the long resistance to no-fault in New York frequently made
reference to the same belief.98 Calling divorce "too easy" implies that it
ought to be harder. Common law defenses to fault in divorce-including
recrimination, condonation, connivance, and collusion-added another layer
of perdurability by forcing the aggrieved spouse to refrain from particular
prohibited conduct (or deny it under oath, perhaps falsely) at pain of
forfeiting the divorce.99

Persons forming contracts when they embarked on a new marriage or
sought to regulate their existing marriage had to tread carefully around the
Essential of perdurability. Until the late twentieth century, the perdurability
rationale underlay judicial rejections of antenuptial agreements concerning
the distribution of property after divorce.,"lo Separation agreements received
a similarly cold reception for decades in American courts." 1
More recent years have marked a shift in favor of these forms of
private ordering, but the perdurability Essential remains in place. 102 Today
states are willing to grant no-fault divorces and to honor antenuptial
contracts and separation agreements not because they have abandoned their
perdurability agenda but because the link between fault criteria or nonenforcement of property agreements on one hand and permanence on the
other has grown harder for them to defend. Illustrating this shift, the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act observes that enforcement of separation
agreements serves to "promote amicable settlement of disputes between
parties to a marriage attendant upon their separation."'0 3 In other words,
their separation being a fait accompli, spouses might as well part company
without the stress of waiting for a judge to tell them how much property
each of them will receive.
Even in the contemporary regime that deems antenuptial agreements
enforceable, courts still read these contracts with attention to perdurability.
98. See J.Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stem, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform
Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 593 (2007); see also Joseph A. Ranney,
Anglicans, Merchants, and Feminists: A Comparative Study of the Evolution of Married
Women's Rights in Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 493,
556 (2000).
99. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 50, at 510-16. Defenses to fault have not
disappeared. New York, for example, recognizes several defenses to adultery as an asserted
ground for divorce; when proved, they keep the marriage alive. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
171 (McKinney 2010).
100. WEISBERG &APPLETON, supra note 50, at 125.
101. Id.at 674.
102. Even the boldest contemporary judicial decision on the law of marriage-the
first to hold that same-sex couples had a constitutional right to marry-embraced the
Essential of perdurability. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass.
2003) (stating that "it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to
one another.. . that is the sine qua non of civil marriage").
103. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 306(a), 9A U.L.A. 248-49 (1998).
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One lawyer with a matrimonial practice published an article in 2008 that
The
warned of "[f]orbidden [p]rovisions in [p]renuptial [a]greements."'"
first forbidden type of agreement discussed in "Forbidden Provisions" is the
deal between spouses that courts reject on the ground that it encourages
divorce. 5 It is odd that courts still purport to worry about this possibility,
because the most popular type of antenuptial contract-the agreement that
preserves assets for a spouse who has them--does indeed encourage
divorce: when a wealthy individual knows that exit from his marriage will
be relatively cheap, that exit becomes more thinkable as well as less costly,
and thus easier.' 6 If encouraging divorce were really fatal to an antenuptial
contract, then many more of these contracts would be deemed
unenforceable.
Although courts generally permit wealthy individuals to benefit from
contracts that make the escape from marriage cheaper, they will also
occasionally invalidate an agreement on the ground that it encourages
divorce by making exit too lucrative for the poorer spouse. "Forbidden
Provisions" noted two mid-1980s California cases, both involving couples
of Middle Eastern ancestry, where courts did not give wives the benefit of
their bargains because the deals paid the wives too much. 7 In re Noghrey
invalidated an antenuptial contract where the husband promised his wife the
value of their house plus either $500,000 or half his assets, whichever sum
This wife argued to no avail that
was greater, in the event of a divorce.'
the agreement had been made to give her the money she would need to live
on without virginity-value, a key asset in the marriage market of the
couple's Iranian-Jewish community: as a non-virgin this wife would
struggle to find another husband.0 9 In re Dajani involved a promised

104. Jonathan E.Fields, Forbidden Provisions in PrenuptialAgreements: Legal and
PracticalConsiderationsfor the MatrimonialLawyer, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 413

(2008).
105.
106.

Id. at 414.
This belief that prenuptial agreements promote divorce may strike us today

as quaintly Victorian, but to me it is naive to believe otherwise. Of course they
promote divorce. If a married man knows that a divorce will cost him half his net
worth, he will be less inclined to walk away from the marriage than if he knows that
a premarital contract will keep those costs to a minimum. And even apart from
these financial considerations, prenuptial agreements may be said to promote
divorce by making the unthinkable thinkable ....
Jeffrey G. Sherman, PrenuptialAgreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 CLEV.
ST.L. REv. 359, 375 (2005).
107. Fields, supra note 104, at 414 (discussing In re Noghrey, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) and In re Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
108. 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154.

109.

Id. at 154-55 (noting that because the bride's virginity was important to the

couple, the bride had assured the groom that she was a virgin and had undergone a medical
examination "for that purpose").
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payment on divorce of 5000 Jordanian dinars, about $1700 in 1988."0 Too
much, said the court when it invalidated the agreement: too tempting for a
discontented wife."'
Although not necessarily evidence of any larger tendency, these two
California decisions illustrate how judges can use Essentials selectively to
achieve the results they want. A court could honor perdurability by
rejecting all antenuptial contracts that allocate property upon divorce.
Contemporary courts do not do so. As Noghrey and Dajani demonstrate,
judges have felt free to impose this Essential on poorer spouses, forcing
them to forgo a relatively generous provision in an antenuptial contract,
while other decisions hold that richer people are free to leave on terms that
hurt their vulnerable spouses." 2
In another contemporary decision that came out badly for a woman, a
Florida appellate court used perdurability as one rationale for refusing to
honor a contract between two lovers, Gina and Brian, who had begun their
sexual relationship while married to other people."' Gina and Brian drafted
an agreement with the help of a lawyer. The agreement provided that in
consideration of Gina's having left "a secure house and marriage," Brian
would either marry Gina within twelve months or support her "indefinitely"
thereafter."' The court deemed the contract void on two grounds. Relying
on the abolition of breach of promise to marry by legislation in Florida, the
court held that state law did not permit the honoring of a contractual
promise to choose between marrying another person and paying out
money. "' The court did not stop at the statutory point, however. It also
deemed the contract unenforceable because the lovers' deal "promote[d]
divorce."" 6 Divorce of Gina, that is, because of the marriage-quitting
110. 251 Cal. Rptr. at871
111. Id.at 872 ("The contract clearly provided for wife to profit by a divorce, and it
cannot be enforced by a California court.").
112. When they find the payoff for the poorer spouse too low, courts can use
unconscionability or "substantial injustice," see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05 (3) (2002), to invalidate the agreement. Courts
rarely invalidate an antenuptial contract on the ground of substantial injustice, and when they
do, see, e.g., Clermont v. Clermont, 603 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), they do not
condemn the agreement as tending to promote divorce. Yet a cheap exit from marriage
promotes divorce no less than the expensive exits of Noghrey and Dajani. See Crouch v.
Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (observing that "a mercenary husband"
could "through abuse and ill treatment of his wife force her to bring an action for divorce and
thereby buy a divorce for a sum far less than he would otherwise have to pay"); Sherman,
supra note 106, at 375 (explaining how an antenuptial agreement makes divorce more
attractive and convenient for a wealthy spouse).
113. Hoffman v. Boyd, 698 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
114. Id.at 348.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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consideration that the agreement recited. Obviously Brian and Gina had
both believed that Gina's marriage was over when they signed their
contract. Gina had left her husband." 7 She had moved in with Brian and
apparently had been hounding him to marry her." 8 Yet perdurability--of
the offstage marriage, to a husband unnamed in the decision-removed
from Gina the value of the bargain she had negotiated.
Common law marriage, whereby two adults can become lawful
spouses with no license or ceremony, offers another illustration of the
perdurability Essential by making criteria out of a "present agreement to be
married" and "holding out" to a community as husband and wife." 9
Consistent with the mystery and obscurity that surround the Essentials,
these terms do not define themselves even to trained lawyers, let alone the
individuals who become bound together this way in jurisdictions that
recognize common law marriage when they fulfill the other two criteria:
capacity to be married (which is required of ceremonial marriage as well)
and cohabitation.' 20 It is at least peculiar, if not contradictory, to say that an
individual had a present agreement to be married when she manifestly did
not fill out a license application or go through a ceremony. What the two
criteria mean, as far as courts are concerned, is behavior that embraces
perdurability. The "present" in "present agreement to be married" translates
to I intend that we are married now. Not engaged, not planning to be
married later; married now. Holding out, similarly, means declaring to
one's community that We are husband and wife, not a casual liaison.
Perdurability-the declared stance. that two people have come together
permanently as a couple, rather than temporarily---distinguishes common
law marriage from mere cohabitation.
Whereas common law marriage became a minority doctrine in the last
decades of the twentieth century, another rule that rests on the'perdurability
essential, the disciplinary provision that bars a lawyer from charging a fee
contingent on the amount of money obtained in a divorce settlement or
judgment,' 2 ' shows almost no sign of retreat.' One lawyer, building an end
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Beswick v. City of Philadelphia, 185 F. Supp. 2d 418, 430-31 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(reciting elements according to Pennsylvania law); Smereczynski v. Sec'y of Dep't Health &
Human Servs., 944 F.2d 296, 298 (6th Cir. 1991) (reciting elements according to Ohio law).
120. See Beswick, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 430-31; Smereczynski, 944 F.2d at 298 (noting
latter two elements).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.5(d)(1) (2007).
121.
122. Very few states permit matrimonial lawyers to be compensated this way for
representing a client in a divorce. The two jurisdictions that I know of that permit a
contingent fee express disapproval of it in comments to their rules of conduct. D.C. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. 7 (2007); TEXAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.04 cmt. 9
(1995). No movement toward modifying the Model Rules prohibition is underway in the
American Bar Association. The development on this front exists outside the legal
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run around this rule, recently formed a business to invest in divorces by
making funds available to poorer spouses in exchange for a stake in the
123
distribution of marital assets to be attained by settlement or judgment,
analogous to the litigation financing that became available to personal
injury claimants in the early 1990s and by 2004 had expanded to include24
dozens of businesses investing in tort litigation on a non-recourse basis.
Just as descriptions of the American-style contingent fee have associated
this form of paying lawyers with expanded justice, 25 this entrepreneur
described her motive as giving help to "the underdog." 26 She bucked a tide.
Lawyers may not make a living contingent on what they can attain for a
poorer spouse in a dispute over winding up the distribution of marital
property because the work of dividing property upon divorce cannot take
place without a divorce, on which the perdurability Essential frowns.
D. Sexual Intercourse and Ongoing Conjugal Intimacy
Vernacular references to the consummation of a marriage, which date
back to the sixteenth century,' 27 bespeak a sexual Essential. Consummation
(a word etymologically related to "sum up," or completion) 28 suggests that
a marriage does not form until a couple in question has gone through a rite
sponsored by the state or a religious entity and also engaged in at least one
act of vaginal intercourse. The law actually imposes no categorical
requirement of sex on persons who seek to join together in marriage. 29 A
marriage undertaken by two persons who have the legal capacity to wed
each other has the force of law upon fulfillment of state criteria pertaining to
a license and ceremony, with or without any physical act. Married couples
may forgo every type of bodily contact yet remain legally married if they so
choose.
profession: litigation financing of divorce, where the financing entity receives a fraction of
the judgment or settlement, has become available. Binyamin Appelbaum, Taking Sides in a
Divorce, ChasingProfit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 45, 2010, at Al.
123. Appelbaum, supra note 122, at Al.
124. Terry Carter, Cash Up Front: New Funding Sources Ease Strains on Plaintiffs

Lawyers, 90 A.B.A. J. 34, 34-36 (2004), counted more than a hundred such businesses. The
reference to "dozens" is intended to exclude other types of litigation financing, such as loans
to plaintiffs' lawyers and investments in commercial rather than personal injury litigation.
125.

Lawrence M. Friedman, Access to Justice: Some Historical Comments, 37
L.J. 3, 9 (2010) (noting that without the contingent fee, the only persons who

FORDHAM URB.

could prosecute personal injury claims are those who can afford to pay lawyers by the hour);
Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-PartyFunding of American Litigation,

58 UCLA L. REv. 571, 607 (2010) (noting "the policy goal of broadening access to justice").
126.

Appelbaum, supranote 122, at Al.

127.
128.

See III
Id.

129.

See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

802 (2d ed. 2001).
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Essentials related to sex have nonetheless endured. The Essential that
pertains to sex will (like most other Essentials, as we have seen) reach the
attention of the state only when someone protests. Inability to engage in
intercourse-what statutes call impotence or impotency-is grounds for an
annulment in many jurisdictions. 3 ° Student author Laurence Drew Borten
notes that even though Maine statutory law had listed impotency as a
ground only for divorce, and not annulment, its supreme court construed
this criterion as sufficient for annulment too, using Essentials reasoning. 3 '
When they annul marriages on the ground that the respondent spouse
concealed an addiction to heroin, courts have focused on the effect of heroin
addiction by one spouse on the couple's sex life, even though this drug
presumably has other disruptive effects on any intimate relationship when
encountered unexpectedly after concealment: 3 ' essentials again. Borten
also reports on the obscure "doctrine of 'triennial cohabitation,"' which
"presumes impotence, without further inquiry, if the marriage has not been
consummated after three years."' 33 States that insist that grounds for
annulment must pertain to essentials, rather than meet a lower standard like
materiality,' 34 regard refusal or incapacity to engage in sex as the
quintessential Essential."'
Sex as an Essential can reach the courts later in the span of a marriage,
after the time or the criteria for an annulment have lapsed. The New York
Court of Appeals in 1926 used this Essential to deny support to an estranged
wife whose husband refused to fulfill their premarital agreement.'36 Before
they married, the spouses had agreed that they would not have sex or live
together until they had been through a Roman Catholic marriage ceremony
as well as the civil one that had preceded it. The wife declared herself ready
130. Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in
Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089, 1098-99 n.41 (2002) (gathering examples of ground
for annulment that include a spouse's being "incapable of entering into the married state
from physical causes" and "impotency") (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(d) (McKinney
1999).
131. Id. at 1098 n.42 (quoting Dolan v. Dolan, 259 A.2d 32, 36 (Me. 1969) (relying
on a plenary statute: "Whenever the validity of a marriage is denied or doubted, either party
may file a libel for annulling the same")). Evidently, the Dolan court believed that an
allegation of impotency constituted an expression of doubt about the validity of the marriage,
even though no statute in the state declared impotency to be a ground for annulment.
132. Id.at 1102.
133. Id.at 1099 (quoting Bissell v. Bissell, 117 A. 252, 254 (N.J. Ch. 1922)).
134. See supra note 34.
135. John Parisi, Note, The (Mis)Categorizationof Sex in Anglo-American Cases of
Transsexual Marriage, 108 MiCH. L. REV. 1497, 1507 (2010) (observing that one important
annulment decision, M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976),
"explicitly held that the ability to have fullintercourse determines the validity of a
marriage").
136. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605 (N.Y. 1926).
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to go through the church ceremony and then live together. Although the
husband refused both the religious ceremony and cohabitation, the court
declared the wife the abandoner for having refused sex and cohabitation
until her husband joined her in the church ritual he had promised. "Public
policy in such a vital matter as the marriage contract should not be made to
yield to subversive private agreements and personal considerations," wrote
the court, ruling that the wife had forfeited her claim to support.'37
Divorce law presents two other sex-related Essentials. State laws
providing for fault-based divorce will typically include adultery and
desertion among the available grounds.' 38 Adultery as a ground for divorce
gives each spouse an exclusive stake in what could be described as the
coital output of the other spouse. Just as an output contract obliges a buyer
to purchase the yield,'39 a spouse also has to accept at least some of the
coital output: refusal can constitute desertion or constructive desertion. 4 '
The premise of this Essential is that a married person must, and is also
entitled to, share a monogamous sexual life with her or his spouse-even if
this person knew or should have known, for whatever reason, not to count
on being so supplied. By requiring a spouse who uses desertion as a ground
for divorce to show the other's intent to abandon the marriage, 4' and
equating rejection of sex with abandonment of the marriage, this Essential
reduces a relationship to one ascribed constituent. The exclusive outputentitlement extends only to sex. Courts do not find adultery or desertion
when the respondent spouse has betrayed or abandoned the petitioner with
respect to emotions, hobbies, career priorities, parental labors, or plans for a
shared old age.'42 The sexual Essential of Marriage privileges one facet of
marital intimacy, again by making a priority of what might not have come
first for the individuals affected.
For a concluding sexual Essential, consider what Twila Perry has
called "a husband having a proprietary interest in his wife's body."'43
Consortium as a cause of action, which in its original form gave a husband
damages when his own body was not harmed by a tortfeasor, recognizes
such an interest.'" The interest stays alive-surviving the death of a
marriage-when an ex-spouse has to pay alimony: most states follow the

137. Id.at 609.
138. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 50, at 470-71.
139. U.C.C. § 2-306; E.ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.15, at 82 (2d ed. 1990).
140. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 50, at 458-61, 470-72.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Reid v. Reid, 375 S.E. 2d 533, 538 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to
consider a wife's claim of constructive desertion based on the husband's emotional and
psychological withdrawal from the marriage).
143. Perry, supra note 14, at 27 n.95.
144. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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rule codified in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act that an obligation to
pay maintenance ceases when one's ex-spouse remarries' 45
This Essential is wispier than others we have examined. It takes no
overt form in the common law, and contemporary statutory law of divorce
aspires to gender-neutrality. Yet because judges do not elaborate on the
belief that it is "unreasonable for a dependent spouse to receive financial
support from a former spouse and a present spouse at the same time" ' 46and because cohabitation or de facto remarriage can also terminate an exspouse's obligation to pay maintenance even though no new spouse has
volunteered for a legal duty of support,'47 eliminating the rationale that an
alimony-paying ex-spouse has been formally supplanted-the conjecture
about a proprietary interest in a body becomes plausible within the law of
maintenance. According to this Essential, "an ex-husband should not have
to support a woman who not only has a new man to support her," as Perry
writes, "but is also now cleaning up for and having sex with this new
48
man.",1
E. Gender Dimorphism
Postponing a discussion of state-level provisions-some of them
codified well before the DOMA era-that limit marriage to opposite-gender
couples in the form of statutory law, 149 we may note here the assertions that
judges have made to enforce the same constraint. Venturesome couples
made up of two men or two women have, over the decades, brought actions
in state and federal courts seeking access to marriage. The subset of this
case law that pertains to Essentials consists of judicial decisions that refused
access to same-sex marriage even though codified law in the jurisdiction
made no demand of gender dimorphism.
By telling individuals that they may not have what they want because
their gender is wrong, even though controlling authority in the jurisdiction
contains no gender-related demand on point, this strand of decisional law
evokes the infamous Bradwell v. Illinois,'

in which the Supreme Court

145. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 316, 9A U.L.A. 102 (1998); Cynthia Lee
Starnes, One More Time: Alimony, Intuition, and the Remarriage-TerminationRule, 81 IND.

L.J. 971 (2006) (arguing against the rule).
146. Amundson v. Amundson, 645 N.W. 2d 837, 839 (S.D. 2002); see also Starnes,
supra note 145, at 995 (reporting a belief, not shared by the author, that "to allow a woman
to collect support from two men-her ex-husband and her current husband-would be
positively unseemly").
147. See Lucas v. Lucas, 592 S.E. 2d 646, 652-53 (W. Va. 2003) (surveying varying
positions in states' laws).
148. Perry, supra note 14, at 26; see also Starnes, supra note 145, at 995-96.
149. See infra Section II.B.
150. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 130 (1873).
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held that Myra Bradwell could not receive a law license even though she
had the qualifications that her male peers possessed, and no statute in her
state excluded women from the practice of law.'5 ' Rejecting Bradwell's
contention that her exclusion violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
the opinion for the Court did not bother to study the governing statute.'52 A
more notorious concurrence mused on the nature of a woman. "The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator," wrote Justice
Joseph P. Bradley.'53 "And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the
general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional
cases."' 54 By "exceptional cases," Justice Bradley referred to the existence
of unmarried women. His concurrence also made approving reference to
the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, which had applied what Bradley
called "the common law ...[that] only men were admitted to the bar."' 55
Just as one of the essentials of holding a law license was, to the Court
in Bradwell, being male, an Essential of Marriage that judges have
identified makes a rule of gender. This Essential demands dimorphism. A
marriage must contain one man and one woman.
Judges reached this liberty-defeating conclusion in the face of silence
from the legislature and a lack of any support from controlling precedent.
In 1973, for example, one court decided that two women were "prevented
from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County
Court Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but rather by their
own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined."'56 To
locate how "that term is defined," the court referred to lexicons that
7
described marriage as a category that contains one man and one woman. 1
It drew an Essentials impediment from two books whose content would
have been inadmissible hearsay under the law of evidence.'58 Other case
law from the pre-DOMA era insisted on gender dimorphism in the absence
of direction from statutes or precedent. '9
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at

155.

Id.at 140.

156.

Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).

130-31.
132-33.
141.
141-42.

157. Id.
158. See FED. R. EVID. 803(18) (noting that in order to be admissible as a "learned
treatise []," a statement must be established "as a reliable authority" either by expert
testimony or judicial notice).
159.

See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (refusing to

allow a male U.S. citizen to claim a man as his spouse for immigration purposes, even
though the statute at issue, a section of the Immigration and Naturalization Code, contained
no reference to gender when making provisions for "spouses"); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
325 N.Y.S. 2d 499, 500-01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (issuing a declaratory judgment that
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A pioneering same-sex couple in Minneapolis, whose challenge to
imposed gender dimorphism generated the first decision by a state supreme
court on the issue, argued that "the absence of an express statutory
prohibition against same-sex marriages evinces a legislative intent to
The Minnesota Supreme Court scoffed in
authorize such marriages."'"
response, maintaining that "a sensible reading of the statute" refuted that
Although no gender-dimorphous definition of marriage
possibility. 6 '
appeared in the statute, the court determined that "common usage" of the
word marriage barred a same-sex couple from access; moreover, the
draftsmen of "territorial days," the court speculated, surely intended to
restrict marriage to one man and one woman.'62 When petitioners reminded
the court about Loving v. Virginia,'63 at the time a recent decision that had
invalidated a categorical restriction on access to marriage, the court retorted
that Loving had rested "solely on the grounds of [the statute's] patent racial
discrimination. '"" 4 Loving had said no such thing.'65 The Baker court
retreated a bit a few lines later: "Loving does indicate that not all state
restrictions upon the right to marry are beyond reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 66 Making a last reference to what it called common sense,
the court declared that "there is a clear distinction between a marital
restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental
67
difference in sex."'
Gender dimorphism persists as a barrier even when one party seeking
to marry or to have a marriage recognized has done all he or she can do to
comply with this demand. Case law has considered whether an individual
whose gender reassignment has been recognized by the state, typically in
the form of a new birth certificate, may enter into a marriage that falls into
the opposite-sex category, assuming that the new gender is accepted. The
majority of American courts have withheld approval of such a marriage,
marriage was a nullity upon the initiative of a male plaintiff who had discovered that the
person he thought was a woman and had married had male genitals). The closest that Adams

came to finding statutory language on point was a quotation from a Colorado provision that
"[a] marriage between a man and a woman licensed, solemnized, and registered ... is valid
in this state." Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1122. Although that statute references gender
dimorphism, it does not require that condition to make a marriage valid. See also Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.5 (Wash. App. 1974) (inferring that although Washington did

not make gender dimorphism a criterion for access to marriage, references to "the female" in
its Revised Code must imply "that a male was contemplated as the other marriage partner").
160.

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971).

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 187.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 15.

166.

Baker, 191 N.W. 2d at 187.

167.

Id.
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refusing to order the issuance of a license or declining to accept validity
after the marriage is formed.'68
A contrary decision from a New Jersey trial court that refused to grant
an annulment to a husband on the ground that his wife was "a male-tofemale transsexual" remains the outlier decades after its publication.'69 In
MT v. J. T., a wife born male who became female-following sex-changing
surgery paid for by her fiance, who as her husband would go on to leave her
and deny the marriage-was deemed married on the ground that she had
"become physically and psychologically unified and fully capable of sexual
activity consistent with her reconciled sexual attributes of gender and
anatomy.' ' 70
Her possession of a vagina with "a good cosmetic
appearance"' 7' that permitted sexual intercourse showed that M.T. "should
be considered a member of the female sex for marital purposes, "172 said the
court, and thus the marriage was valid. Though more tolerant than other
decisional law on point, MT v. J.T also relied on an Essential of gender
dimorphism. This one was contingent on the skill and luck of a surgeon,
along with a patient's psychological response to his handiwork.
Some courts that issued non-recognition judgments of marriages
involving transgendered persons have called on their state legislatures to
weigh in with new statutory law.' 73 That position has a humble air--"the
least dangerous branch"'174 bowing modestly to elected legislators-but like
other judicial applications of the Essentials of Marriage, it is an action by
the state that nullifies what persons wanted and went out of their way to
choose. An individual cleared the many hurdles that make it difficult to
change one's assigned gender, received state recognition of the change, and
then tried to embark on a marriage with a willing opposite-sex partner while
168. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136 (Kan. 2002) (holding that a
transgendered wife could not inherit after a husband died intestate); Kantaras v. Kantaras,
884 So. 2d 155, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (refusing to dissolve a marriage between a
woman identified as female from birth and a transgendered woman, declaring it void ab
initio); In re Marriage of Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at
*9 (Ohio Ct. App.) (refusing to issue a license to a couple consisting of one woman identified
as female from birth and one transgendered woman); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to allow a transgendered widow to bring an action for medical
malpractice in her capacity as spouse).
169. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 210-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
170. Id. at211.
171. Id. at206.
172. Id. at211.
173. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230; Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 161 ("Until the Florida
legislature... amends the marriage statutes to clarify the marital rights of a postoperative
transsexual person, we must adhere to the common meaning of the statutory terms and
invalidate any marriage that is not between persons of the opposite sex determined by their
biological sex at birth."); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E. 2d 828, 832 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
174.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1982).
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complying with all other criteria for entry into marriage.'75 Judges who say
that they cannot cooperate with this life plan until a legislature takes some
undescribed new steps that would "clarify the marital rights of a
postoperative transsexual person,"'76 without saying what that demand
would achieve, stray from parsimony and transparency.
F. Domicile: A Superseded Essential, With Lessons
The First Restatement of Conflicts, published in 1934, declared that
the domicile of a married couple is the state in which the husband resides.
"The husband is the head of the family," explained the First Restatement,
"which includes the wife and minor children, and in normal cases the
members of the family are domiciled at the place where he has his domicil.
'
On marriage, the wife takes the domicil the husband has at that time." 177
The Restatement recognized one exception to its generalization about
"normal cases": a wife who "lives apart from her husband without being
guilty of desertion according to the law of the state that was their domicil at
the time of separation ...can have a separate domicil."'' T For example, the
Restatement continued, the couple could have separated and chosen to live
in different states by mutual consent, or the husband might have been the
deserter when he changed his domicil.'79
Consequences followed for women who had had their own ideas about
where they were living. In Price v. Greenway"8 ' the unnamed plaintiff, a
native of Pennsylvania, had two years before filing her complaint married
one Dana Price, whose domicile was Iowa. The couple separated a month
after marrying and the wife signed up for the Women's Army Corps. When
enlisting, she wrote Newburgh, New York as her home on a military form.
Hurt while riding as a passenger on a bus, she brought a personal injury
action in federal court against New Jersey defendants, giving New York as
her domicile. Neither her adversaries nor the court agreed with her
contention about where she lived. The defendants claimed she was a New
Jersey resident on the ground that she had been stationed in Newark at the
time of the accident. The court ruled that because Iowa was her husband's
home state, she was domiciled in Iowa.
175. See Parisi, supra note 135, at 1501-04 (surveying the burdens of changing one's
gender in the contemporary United States and relating these efforts to judicial nonrecognition).
176.

Kantaras,884 So.2d at 161.

177. Comments a and b to RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS § 27 cmt. a, b (1934).
In this Article I use the more familiar spelling of "domicile," except when quoting or
paraphrasing the Restatement, as here, or referring to an individual herself as "a domicil."
178. Id. at§28.
179. Id.
180. 167 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1948).
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Some wife-litigants agreed that they lived in their husband's state of
residence but disagreed about where exactly they resided in that state. In an
opinion joined by Judge Cardozo, the New York Court of Appeals ruled
unanimously in 1931 that a woman named Mabel Daggett did not reside in
18
Manhattan because her husband's residence was in another county. '
Accordingly her will had to be probated in the county her husband had
chosen as his home even though she, the wealthier partner to the marriage
who had "determined substantially all questions of the movements of
herself and her husband,"'82 had declared in her will that she resided in New
York County. "If Mrs. Daggett had been a single woman," wrote the court,
"she would have been free to select her own residence or domicile without
let or hindrance ... but she was a married woman and a married woman
cannot, to suit her convenience or pleasure
merely, create a legal residence
1' 83
for herself apart from her husband.'
Two women fighting to be school superintendent in Franklin County,
Mississippi litigated the question of marital domicile. An election for the
post held in December 1928 resulted in 724 votes for one and 719 for the
other. 8 4 After the election, the plaintiff, Ada Guice, recipient of the 719
votes, married "one Raymond Weisinger, of Texas."'8 5 Her opponent, the
recipient of 724 votes, promptly filed a motion stating that Mrs. Weisinger
was now no longer a resident of Mississippi; and under Mississippi law, a
nonresident of the state could not serve as school superintendent. The court
sided with the opponent, dispatching Ada Guice Weisinger's political
ambitions in Mississippi on the ground that Mr. Weisinger had never
purported to live in that state:
It is not necessary for us to determine whether the evidence discloses where the
domicile of the appellant's husband, in fact, is; for it is clear therefrom (there is no
contention to the contrary) that he has never lived in Mississippi, from which it
follows that his domicile, and consequently that of his wife, is8 6 not in this state.
The appellant has lost her right to the office here in controversy.'

Husbands, not just wives, suffered adverse consequences when courts
applied this Essential. In Gardner v. Gardner, a divorce case decided in
1950, a husband was domiciled in New York yet sought a divorce in New
Jersey.'87 The couple had lived together first in New York and then in
Jersey City. After the wife deserted the husband in 1931, husband and wife
then lived separately in New Jersey until the husband returned to New York.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

In re Daggett's Will, 174N.E. 641, 642 (N.Y. 1931).
Id.
Id.
Guice v. McGehee, 124 So. 643, 644 (Miss. 1929).
Id.at 647.
Weisingerv. McGehee, 134 So. 148, 150 (Miss. 1931).
71 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1950).
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Both the trial and appellate court rejected his petition for divorce on the
ground of desertion. Jurisdiction was not present, according to the
Appellate Division: a wife may not "by her wrongful act, desertion, and the
very process of its continuance, thereby release herself from the status our
law imposes upon her with respect to her domicile being that of her
husband."' 8 If the court had been willing to recognize the wife's domicile
in New Jersey, the husband would have been eligible for the New Jersey
divorce he sought.
Quaint cases, as we have seen, raise the recurring question: why care?
This vestige of the common law appears obsolete. The treatment of the
subject in the Restatement of Conflicts, published in 1971, gives an answer.
Section 21 reads in its entirety: "The rules for the acquisition of a domicil of
choice are the same for both married and unmarried persons."'' 9 Continuing
its project of modernization, in 1988 the Restatement switched its old topic
heading for the section, "Married Women, Children, and Incompetents" to
the neutral-sounding "Acquisition and Change of Domicil."'9 ° Transparent,
parsimonious, egalitarian. The only complication is in the Comments:
The common law rule [is] that a married woman takes the domicil[e] of her
husband by operation of law so long as she lives with him. It may be questioned,

however, whether this rule is consistent with modem views as to the legal position
of married women. It also seems probable that the principle reason for the
of the rule is that the courts have had little reason to
continued application
91
reexamine it.'

In other words, although the Reporters did all they could to state a
clear, gender-egalitarian, freedom-respecting rule about domicile and to
expunge an old Topic that had lumped married women together with
incompetent persons, the current Restatement of Conflicts lacks both
statutes and case law to cite in support of its modernized revision. Prepared
and published by a private nonprofit, Restatements do not make law.'92
Uncertainty remains. A lawyer whose client asks about the domicile of a
married woman who lives in a different state from her husband cannot give

188.
189.

Id. at 133.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

21 (1971).

190. Id., Reporters' Notes.
191. Id., cmt. a.
192. See generally Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663,
1665-67 (1995) (describing the Restatement-writing work of the ALl). In the Virgin Islands,
alone among U.S. jurisdictions, ALT restatements have the effect of self-executing law. See
V.I. CODE ANN., tit. 1, § 4 (2010) ("The rules of the common law, as expressed in the
restatements of the law approved by the American Law Institute .. .shall be the rules of
decision in the courts of the Virgin Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of
local laws to the contrary.").
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a definitive answer.'93 A judge who holds enlightened "modem legal views
as to the legal position of married women" is similarly bereft of precedent
and statutory authority when faced with a question about a married
woman's domicile. All the Restatement can say to guide the perplexed is
that the problem does not arise very often: "[I]n the vast majority of
situations," it declares, "a wife who lives with her husband in a certain place
will regard that place as her home." '94 Indeed. Yet the eight illustrations of
debatable domicile supplied in the Comments-including a wife-politician
resembling Ada Guice Weisinger'95 -are not farfetched and do not exhaust
the variations that can arise when persons marry each other and maintain
households in two locations.
The example of domicile also shows that obscurity pervading the
Essentials of Marriage makes it difficult to tell whether, or when, an
Essential has become so unpopular over time that it no longer holds legal
power over individuals. Consider desuetude, which courts have used
occasionally to nullify disused prohibitions.'96 According to one paraphrase
of this doctrine, "laws lapse, and can no longer be enforced, when their
enforcement has already become exceedingly rare because the principle
behind them has become hopelessly out of step with people's
convictions."' 97 The Essentials of Marriage might also be subject to
invalidation by desuetude. The crucial distinction they introduce here,
however, pertains to the freedom of individuals. To the extent it functions
as a doctrine, desuetude extinguishes criminal laws, leaving individuals

193.

The Restatement gives the example of a woman who lives in State X when she

meets and marries a man who lives in State Y. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF

LAWS § 21, cmt. b (1971). This wife considers State X her domicile, and the couple spends
most of its time in her home there. Id. The husband maintains his home in State Y. Id. In
an effort to preserve her original domicile, the wife executes a written agreement with her
husband reciting that State X remains her domicile. Id. According to the Restatement, if tax

authorities in State Y insist that this wife became domiciled in State Y as a result of her
marriage, they would be wrong, because the wife retained her domicile in State X. See id.
Undoubtedly this illustration is intended to help the reader, but it increases rather than
lessens my puzzlement. The written agreement that the husband and wife executed seems
otiose in light of § 21, which declares that all adults, married and unmarried alike, establish
their domicile the same way. Why did the couple state their domicile in a document, when
other people needn't bother? Moreover, because the couple was spending "by far the greater
part of each year in W's house in X," id., I would have thought it was the husband, not the
wife, who would need a recitation of his intent to remain domiciled in his original home
state. Was the written agreement necessary for the wife's retention of her domicile, or just a
costly belt-and-suspenders precaution? The Restatement doesn't say.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 184-79 and accompanying text.
196. See BICKEL, supra note 174, at 62-63.
197. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WI-y EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 97 (2005).
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freer to do what they want.'98 Like unpopular old criminal prohibitions,
several Essentials of Marriage have deteriorated over time in their force and
acceptance. But as long a judge can impose them to thwart individual
choice, they retain their threat to freedom.
Because laws about domicile typically govern state action rather than
agreements between individuals-judges use them to decide whether they
have jurisdiction, which state's law to apply to a dispute, whether travel is a
tax-deductible expense, which state debtor-creditor law protects or burdens
an insolvent individual and so forth-they pertain to the relationship
between equal protection doctrine and the Essentials of Marriage. I take up
this discussion below. 99 For the moment, domicile as an Essential offers a
useful illustration of how state action can spread beyond state actors.
Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, the decision that struck down a

tuition rule that ascribed to married female students the domicile of their
husbands, regardless of where these women believed they lived, spent much
time discussing whether Penn State, Temple, Pitt, and other Pennsylvania
colleges and universities, along with their administrators, were "persons,"
"state actors," "state instrumentalities," and other terms of art.2"0 The rule
had been written by the state Auditor General; private colleges in the state
apparently had abided by it as well. 0 ' When the federal courts of
Pennsylvania invalidated the tuition rule as unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause,"' they caused private actors to change their treatment of
tuition-paying women who were married. It becomes reasonable to infer
that other Essentials that apply to state action will influence non-state action
as well, extending the impingement that governments impose.
II.ESSENTIALS FORMED OUTSIDE THE COMMON LAW

So far our survey suggests that Essentials of Marriage, though still
vital, have fallen into retreat. A few cases discussed in the last Part sound
positively risible, as does William Blackstone's description of coverture as
state-imposed forfeiture of a married woman's legal identity. The last
Essential discussed, pertaining to the domicile of a married woman, was

198. For this purpose an older statement of the doctrine is more accurate:
"'Desuetude' is the ancient doctrine that long and continuous failure to enforce a statute,
coupled with open and widespread violation of it by the populace, is tantamount to repeal of
the statute." Ronald J. Allen, The Police andSubstantive Rulemaking: ReconcilingPrinciple
andExpediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 81 (1976).
199. See infra Section III.C.
200. Samuel v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1976).

201.
202.

Id. at 1132-34.
Id.
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declared moribund by the American Law Institute in 1971.203 Declines in
the Essentials of Marriage-or, in Jana Singer's phrase, "the privatization of
family law'
have moved marriage along the famed axis that Henry
Sumner Maine announced in 1864: "from Status to Contract. 20 5 As the
Essentials of Marriage deteriorate and lose their hold on judges, however, a
countermove by legislators resists this erosion, and another Essential, a rule
of geographic presence, persists outside of both common and statutory law.
From 1996 to 2004, both Congress and the majority of state
legislatures wrote a key Essential of Marriage, gender dimorphism, into
newly codified laws. °6 This legislation has generated an enormous critical
literature. 207 With the rush of defense-of-marriage lawmaking apparently
stalled,2 8 this Article joins writings that look backward on the DOMA
phenomenon.2 °9 My commentary on DOMA in this Article examines it as a
bolster of Essentials. Defense of Marriage legislation circa 1996-2004
demonstrates that not only judges, but legislators too, resist the move from
Status to Contract, or toward privatization of family law, by acting to thwart
what some same-sex couples pursue for themselves. The other Essential
considered in this Part is the demand that couples be present within the
geographic boundaries of a jurisdiction if they wish to marry under its laws.
A. DOMA as a Source of Federal Rights and Detriments
Until 1996, the American national government stayed out of defining
and regulating marriage. It left this area of regulation to the states. "State
control over marital status determinations predates the Constitution," wrote
one court in 2010, noting that before the American Revolution it was
colonial governments rather than Parliament in Britain that regulated

203.
204.

See supra Section I.F.
Singer, supra note 49.

205.
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Ashley Montagu ed., Univ.
of Ariz. Press 1986) (1864).
206. See sources cited supra note 2 (reviewing literature on the federal DOMA); see
also supranote 7 and accompanying text (noting state DOMAs).
207. See supra note 2. I made a small contribution to this corpus. Anita Bernstein,
Subverting the Marriage-Amendment Crusade with Law and Policy Reform, 24 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'y 79 (2007).

208. A trickle of DOMA-style enactments continued after 2004. Arizona, for
example, approved a constitutional amendment in 2008 after the measure failed in 2006. See
Atuz. CONST. art. 30.
209. See, e.g., Jerry Simon Chasen, Is DOMA Doomed?, PROB. & PROP., Feb. 2011,
at 22; Koppelman, supra note 13; W. Sherman Rogers, The Constitutionalityof the Defense

of MarriageAct and State Bans on Same-Sex Marriage: Why They Won't Survive, 54 HOW.
L.J. 125 (2010).
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marriage.2 1° State judges and legislators around the country have generated
divergent rules. Who may marry, how spouses may set the terms of their
relationship, what constitutes grounds for divorce, how property is divided
upon dissolution, which fraction (if any) of a decedent's estate a spouse may
inherit, and other law-of-marriage questions receive different answers
around the United States.
This variety has been provoking criticism and concern since the
1880s. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, law
reformers offered numerous proposals to federalize marriage by both
Members of Congress
legislation and constitutional amendment.2 1'
steadfastly rejected these initiatives, maintaining that a federal law of
marriage would usurp the power of the states.2"2

Consequently the federal government had to live with contradictory
stances on marital status. Before 1996, whenever federal law paid attention
to this status-in contexts like immigration, Social Security transfer
payments, jointly filed income tax returns, assertions of marital privilege
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example-it routinely deferred to
the states. Just as "the privatization of family law" ' encouraged
individuals "freely [to] choose to make of their lives what they wish"2 4'
regardless of what an outsider would think of their arrangement, the
longstanding federal recognition of contradictory state rules on marital
status condoned heterogeneity. There might be a One Best Way to identify
which persons were or could be married to each other, and what followed
But for two centuries the United States
from that determination.
government proceeded as if a multiplicity of marital-status regulatory
regimes were better than one.
Enter the third and final section of DOMA:
Section 3. Definition of 'marriage' and 'spouse':
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.215

As we have already seen, the Essential of gender dimorphism had existed
before Congress codified DOMA. Same-sex couples who protested their
lack of access to marriage, along with litigants who contended that a
210. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236
(D. Mass. 2010).
211. Id. at 237.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 49.
214. See Mnookin, supra note 27, at 1018.
215. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, § 7.
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marriage lacked the force of law because one party to the marriage had been
born into the same gender as his or her spouse, gave judges several
opportunities to hold that a union between one man and one man or one
woman and one woman could not be a marriage, even when statutes and
case law in the jurisdiction had imposed no such barrier.2 6 Section 3 of
DOMA renewed the strength of this Essential. Its other substantive
provision, Section 2, added only stasis.2" 7 In Section 3, for the first time
Congress codified a federal definition of marriage that overtly included an
Essential." 8
Consequences of this Essential rippled out. A report prepared by the
General Accounting Office counted more than a thousand federal
regulations and statutory provisions affected by this Essential of
Marriage. 21'9 The report shows how far state-based determinations of marital
status reach into the entitlements and requirements that the federal
government imposes. Marital status affects federal law on the importation
of flowers, 221 the regulation of fishery, 2 ' and restrictions on importing
cultural property,222 among other esoterica gathered by the GAO. 2 3 The
announcement in early 2011 that the Department of Justice would no longer
defend DOMA in court left the sprawl of these Essentials undisturbed: 24 as
long as the statute remains law, the federal government will continue to
demand marital gender dimorphism in hundreds of its statutes and
regulations.
216. See supranotes 146-67.
217. Responding in part to Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993), a decision
that members of Congress understood to encourage or even compel the Hawaii legislature to
make same-sex marriage available in that state, see Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial
Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1, 170 (1999),
DOMA set out to cabin this perceived eccentricity in its remote Pacific location. Section 2
reminded other states that they need not recognize same-sex marriages formed in Hawaii or
any other jurisdiction.
218. The Justice Department announced in February 2011 that it would not work to
enforce this Essential in court. See Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on
Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act, Feb. 23, 2011, available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 I/February/i 1-ag-223.html (announcing that the Attorney
General had concluded that Section 3 of DOMA violated the Equal Protection Clause)
[hereinafter DOJ Letter].
219. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Defense of Marriage Act, Gen. Accounting Office
Rep. OGC-97-16, at 2 (1997) [hereinafter GAO Report]; see also infra notes 327-28
(praising this report for the information it generated).
220. 7 U.S.C. § 4311 (2006).
221. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (2006).
222. 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (2006).
223. GAO Report, supra note 219, at 8 (flowers), 41 (cultural property), and 43
(fisheries).
224. DOJ Letter, supranote 218.
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B. Gender Dimorphism as a Statutory Criterion for Entry Into Marriage
Before the enactment of DOMA, a few states had codified legislation
limiting marriage to one man and one woman.225 The pattern before 1996
had been to mention gender dimorphism but not underscore it as necessary
for a valid marriage. References to "one man and one woman" mark a postDOMA modification; in the pre-DOMA era, gender dimorphism apparently
ranked below other criteria, such as consent. For example, before DOMA,
North Dakota had defined marriage as "a personal relation arising out of a
civil contract between a male and a female to which the consent of the
parties is essential. '226 In 1997, the statute was amended to state that
"[m]arriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between one
man and one woman ....,,22'
A statute in North Carolina dating back at
least to 1945 provided that "[a] valid and sufficient marriage is created by
the consent of a male and female person who may lawfully marry, presently
to take each other as husband and wife, freely, seriously, and plainly
expressed by each in the presence of each other ...;-22 only in 1996 did
North Carolina go on to say that "[m]arriages, whether created by common
law, contracted, or performed outside of North Carolina, between
229
individuals who are of the same gender are not valid in North Carolina.
Other states also put the Essential of gender dimorphism into stronger form
20
by declaring that same-sex marriage was contrary to their public policy.
Legislative supremacy, which holds that statutes outrank law as it is
found or made by judges, gives a codified Essential more force than its
common law counterparts. The Hawaii Supreme Court had encouraged
marriage-equality activists with a liberal ruling in 1993,231 but that
encouragement came to an end in 1998 when voters approved a
constitutional amendment providing that the state legislature had "the power
'
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples;"232
the legislature accepted that
33
power, enacting a state-level DOMA.
Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that
225.

See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §

40-1-103 (2009).
226.
227.

N.D.S.L. 1975, ch. 126, §1 (1975).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-03-01 (West 2009). Wyoming, another state that

adopted DOMA, used similar language in its 1977 version of gender dimorphism: "Marriage
is a civil contract between a male and a female person to which the consent of the parties
capable of contracting is essential." WYO.STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (West 2010).
228.

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.

229.

Id. at §51-1.2.

230.

See, e.g.,

§ 51-1 (West 2010).

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 23-115 (West 2010); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §

402.040 (West 2010).
231. See supranote 217.
232.
233.

HAW. CONST. art. 1,§ 23.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (2007).
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attained more success in making same-sex marriage available, could not
have found a right of same-sex couples to marry if the Massachusetts
legislature had done what the majority of state legislatures had chosen to do
and enacted a state version of DOMA. Before the DOMA movement took
hold, judges could decide that same-sex couples had no right to marry, but
authority for that proposition had consisted of only of quotations from
dictionaries, nouns and pronouns that might or might not imply a criterion
of gender dimorphism, and spotty case law amounting to no more than
persuasive authority.
C. Another Essential: Geographic Presence
Until recently no published recitation of the Essentials of Marriage
had noticed that one Essential, even more unexamined that the others we
have reviewed, is geographic presence in the state in which the parties form
their marital union. This Essential is hard to classify. I have placed it
here-along with other Essentials that originated away from the common
law--even though it is different from the statutory Essentials that we have
just considered. The geographic criterion for entry into marriage has been
codified nowhere and spelled out in no decisional law."' Individuals and
governments simply proceed as if it were an ineffable truth. To recall
Holmes once again: 235 this Essential is "a brooding omnipresence in the sky"
that looms over American marriage law, rather than "the articulate voice of
some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified."
Adam Candeub and Mae Kuykendall summarize the geographic
criterion for entry into marriage with reference to a lack of parsimony and
transparency: "Current marriage procedure"-that is, the set of rules for
entry prevalent in the United States that Modernizing Marriage
'
challenges-"is archaic, often strange, and, oddly, rarely questioned."236
By
"archaic," the authors mean that the reasons for requiring the couple to
appear physically inside a jurisdiction have grown obsolete. Governments
234. The closest to legal authority on this point that I know of is a 2010 letter from
the deputy clerk of the marriage bureau of the District of Columbia to the Reverend Sheila
Alexander-Reid, who had celebrated the marriage of Mark Reed and Dante Walkup. During
the ceremony, Reed and Walkup had gathered with friends in Dallas while Reverend
Alexander-Reid, speaking from the District, performed the ceremony over Skype. The letter
declared that because the marriage had not been performed "within the jurisdictional and
territorial limits of the District of Columbia," the return of the license by Reverend
Alexander-Reid was invalid, and therefore the marriage could not be registered. The deputy
clerk cited no authority other than the D.C. Code provision recognizing authorized officiants
who may celebrate or witness marriages. Letter from Denise Johnson to Sheila AlexanderReid (Nov. 22, 2010) (on file with author).
235. See sources cited supra note 22 and accompanying text.
236. Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 37, at 740.
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used to keep an eye out for bigamy and incest by requiring the physical
presence of couples.237 Centralized and accessible recordkeeping serves that
goal better today.
Just as the judge-made Essentials of Marriage have weakened in
recent decades, procedural burdens imposed on a marrying couple have
waned. Waiting periods, tests for sexually transmitted diseases, and
understandings of marriage licenses as proclaiming the equivalent of banns
are mostly absent from contemporary rules.238 Modem decisional law from
the Supreme Court expounding on the constitutional ight to marry swept
out barriers that might be described as procedural. Until 1967, Virginia had
"a prohibition against issuing marriage licenses until the issuing official
239
[was] satisfied that the applicants' statements as to their race are correct.Wisconsin, until 1978, prohibited a class of its residents from entering into
marriage, "within the State or elsewhere, without first obtaining a court
order granting permission to marry. ''2'
The Missouri Division of
Corrections until 1987 would not allow prison inmates to marry unless they
had permission from the superintendent of prisons, and this superintendent
needed "compelling reasons," which in practice were limited to inmate
pregnancy, to grant permission. 2411 When the Court held that these
impediments violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the
Constitution, they eliminated procedural barriers, a cluster of impediments
of which the geographic-presence Essential is a member.
As Candeub and Kuykendall document, the procedural impediment
thwarting couples who seek to marry according to the law of a remote
jurisdiction is very different from the regulatory law that governs
242
corporations, a regime described in 1965 as "largely enabling.
Uncontroversial doctrines liberally permit "individuals to access and utilize
state legal systems to facilitate their business purposes, with or without
physical presence within the state. 2 43 An oft-noted illustration is the
popularity of incorporation in Delaware by entities whose managers,
employees, and owners might never have set foot in that small state. Lured
by laws they like-on incorporation criteria, internal affairs, ownership and
transfer of stock, or any other point their management cherishes-these

237. See Memorandum from Mae Kuykendall to Aliza Cohen (Jan. 13, 2011) (on file
with author) ("Conceptually, geographic regulation of marriage is an historical accident. It
emerged to allow the Church and local communities to regulate bigamy and incest.").
238. Candeub & Kuykendall, supranote 37, at 774-75.
239. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1967).
240. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978).
241. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987).
242. Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 37, at 783 n.209 (citing Elvin R. Latty, Why
Are Business CorporationLaws Largely "Enabling"?,50 CORNELL L. REv. 599 (1965)).
243. Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 37, at 783.
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businesses pick Delaware from a bounteous menu of jurisdictions. 2"
Commercial contracts routinely include choice of law provisions that name
a jurisdiction whose law will govern their interpretation; parties are free to
pick any state they want.245 When it comes to commercial choices often
about which jurisdiction's law to use, states stay out of the way of lawful
private ordering.
The electronic marriage proposal has a foundation not only in
precedents like proxy marriage 246 and doctrines pertaining to business, 247 but
also in pertinent scholarship. Property theorists Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky have urged that in some contexts "owners be permitted to
adopt out-of-state property forms,2 48 setting the stage for electronic
marriage. Their essay, On Property and Federalism, may be read to have
anticipated the proposal by Candeub and Kuykendall.
In a section pertinent to electronic marriage, Bell and Parchomovsky
distinguish "defensive" from "offensive" uses of this opportunity to make
clear that only the former, non-aggressive version ought to be accepted.249
Bell and Parchomovsky give the useful example of adverse possession.
Because gaining title to land this way can hurt somebody else, encroachers
should be constrained by in-state rules.25 ° Forming a new business or a new
marriage, by contrast, encroaches on nobody else's interests. 251
Accordingly Bell and Parchomovsky, citing earlier work by Larry Ribstein,

244. Commentators celebrate this result. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIEs REGULATION 213 (2002) (praising
the "race"); Leo E. Strine, The Delaware Way: How We Do CorporateLaw and Some of the
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 673-74 (2005) (arguing
"that the United States' system of federalism, which permits corporations to govern their
internal affairs through the laws of a state of their choosing, has enabled the evolution of a
,national corporate law'-i.e., that of Delaware-that better facilitates wealth creation than
would the type of corporation law that Congress would likely produce."). But see George W.
Dent, Jr., For Optional Federal Incorporation, 35 J. CORP. L. 499, 517 (2010) (noting
limitations of the model).
245. Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration
System: Choice and Preemption, in EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 63, 64 (2006) (observing that choice of law clauses "abound" in
business contracts).
246. See supranote 39.
247. See supranotes 242-45 and accompanying text.
248. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Property and Federalism, 115
YALE L.J. 72, 115 (2005).
249. Id. at 108-09.
250. Id.
251. Gregory Mitchell has argued that making electronic marriage available could
hurt people. Gregory Mitchell, Should it Be Easierto Get Married?, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV.
217. His concerns must be addressed by any state that implements the Candeub-Kuykendall
proposal, but are not fatal to its adoption.
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agree that the marriage-formation law of each state ought to be accessible to
persons outside its geographic boundary."'
11.

SOME DIFFICULTIES OF THE ESSENTIALS OF MARRIAGE

The obscure, uncatalogued nature of Essentials might counsel judges
and legislatures to leave them alone. Why worry? This Part offers three
answers to that question.
A. They Conflict with Modem Contractual Freedom in Marriage
A voluminous literature has investigated the relationship between
marriage and contract. The two concepts are juxtaposed when one queries
whether contracts alone can regulate the needs, obligations, and entitlements
of persons who come together in a conjugal bond. Several writers have
argued that the legal status of marriage ought to be abolished; they would
reassign traditional noncontractual family law to the job of looking out for
the welfare of dependents, particularly children.2"3 Defenders of marriage
have responded to this abolitionist proposal by contending that this legal
status is necessary.254 Individuals who form couples necessarily "will
contract incompletely" and "turn to gap fillers provided by the state." ' At
a general plane, the defenders are ascendant. Courts and legislatures
manifest no desire to take the state out of the marriage business; most gay
rights activists seeking sexual-orientation parity in the law of marriage have
pressed for same-sex access to the institution rather than its abolition. The
' has not yet resulted in the end of
vaunted shift "from Status to Contract"256
Status, or even a likelihood that this status will go away in the foreseeable
future.
Equally manifest, however, is "a modem trend in favor of private
ordering" within marriage.257 Some "private ordering" in the marital context
will not be acceptable in American courts any time soon: agreements in
which one party promises never to seek child support from the other party in
exchange for some consideration, for example, or agreements with respect
to marriage whose consideration is the termination of a pregnancy. But
courts faced with intraspousal agreements have moved unmistakably in the
direction of liberality and tolerance.
252.
253.
254.
2006).
255.
(2006).
256.

257.

Bell & Parchomovsky, supranote 248, at 111-12.
See Bernstein, supra note 52, at 135 n. 19 (citing sources).
See MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (Anita Bernstein ed.,

Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1311, 1314
See supranote 205 and accompanying text.
WEISBERG & APPLETON, supranote 50, at 674.
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Antenuptial contracting offers a clear illustration of this development.
Even before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld an especially sharp
deal in 1990, refusing to inquire into the substantive fairness of a contract
executed on "the eve of the parties' wedding," 258 American courts moved
firmly toward acceptance of these bargains between spouses. In less than a
generation, they shifted from deeming these contracts contrary to public
policy-because they encouraged divorce and could also force the less
wealthy spouse to become a public charge-to the view that couples are
entitled to make their own arrangements with respect to their property and
should have their contracts enforced. 2 9 A uniform statute states this
prerogative in especially tolerant terms, demanding that the party to the
marriage who seeks to avoid enforcement prove either that she did not make
the agreement voluntarily or that the agreement was unconscionable at the
time of execution.260
In a parallel development, judges have also manifested their
acceptance of separation agreements. The American Law Institute has
observed that contemporary courts defer even more to separation
agreements than to antenuptial ones. 6 One proponent of private ordering
has conceded that the throes of separation might make it difficult for
couples to attain "deliberative and well-informed judgments.2 62 Courts
nevertheless honor the judgments that take form in these agreements. Thisstance expresses a belief that individuals are suited to set the terms for their
lives.
B. They Lack Adequate Jurisprudential Justification
Making reference to jurisprudential writings-and with forthright
acknowledgment that readers can disagree-I have elsewhere stated my
view that legislators and courts ought to make the law as intelligible and
defensible as it can be.2 63 Intertwined concepts of public reason, public
reasonableness, and public justification support the endeavor. These
jurisprudential ideals are especially pertinent to any legal doctrine that has,

258. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 163 (Pa. 1990).
259. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 50, at 125.
260. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9C U.L.A. 35 (2001).
261. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §
7.09 cmt. b (2002). One court went so far as to hold that an ex-wife who had hired a hit man
to kill her ex-husband did not by her gross misconduct forfeit the maintenance that her exhusband owed her pursuant to their separation agreement. Richardson v. Richardson, 218
S.W. 3d 426, 430 (Mo. 2007). Pactasunt servanda, indeed.
262. Mnookin, supranote 27, at 1020.
263. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 364.
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or is suspected of having, religious antecedents.2" To comment on the
Essentials of Marriage, I return briefly to public reason here.
Some restrictions on individual freedom pertaining to marriage appear
to originate in antecedents that clash with modem secular precepts of
government. Throughout this Article, I have been contending that coverture
still limits what individuals can choose to govern their marriages.
Coverture, in turn, may have origins in religion. 6 Limits on freedom that
the law imposes, especially those that burden wives, might not stem directly
from theological dogma, but a theme of patriarchal control is shared by
monotheistic religions and coverture.266 Inasmuch as the Essentials of
Marriage entrench an illiberal tradition, they raise a question of legitimacy
in a secular state.
Late in his career, John Rawls had occasion to reflect on public reason
as applied to family law. He noted that the family was among "the
institutions needed to reproduce political society over time," and the state
had an interest in supporting and regulating this institution.267 "Given this
interest," Rawls concluded, "the government would appear to have no
interest in the particular form of family life, or of relations among the sexes,
except insofar as that form or those relations in some way affect the orderly
reproduction of society over time." '68 In considering the effect of religious
antecedents on legal regulations of the family, Rawls discussed, without
entirely accepting, a stance taken by the philosopher Robert Audi.269
Religious motivations and reasons behind secular laws exist,
according to Audi, and these antecedents do not invalidate these laws.27
Instead, observers should consider whether these laws can stand with those
religious bases removed. 7' This attention to what "we share as rational
beings" '72 informs the examination of the Essentials of Marriage in a secular
264. Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic
Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677 (1993); John Rawls, The Idea of PublicReason Revisited,
64 U. CHi. L. REV. 765 (1997).
265. See Frances Raday, Gender andReligion: Secular Constitutionalism Vindicated,
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2769, 2780 (2009) ("The monotheistic religions all have regulatory
norms on marriage, which share the theme of patriarchy in a hierarchical gendered family.
There are significant differences in the specific marital laws of each religion, but the
patriarchal asymmetry in power between husbands and wives is evident in all.").
266. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
19, 42 (1995) (arguing that the legal treatment of single parents "is grounded in religion. It is
connected to the regulation of sexuality, protection against uncertainty of paternity, and the
preservation of patriarchal marriage."); Raday, supranote 258.
267. Rawls, supra note 264, at 779.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 779-80.
270. Audi, supra note 264, at 690.
271. Id. at 701.
272. Id.
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democracy. Such attention gives few answers, however. It is not obvious,
as Rawls notes, how to apply the directive that Audi offers without
'
privileging a particular strain of "secular philosophical doctrines."273
This Article escapes the privileging difficulty by not prescribing any
particular doctrinal outcome. For example, I happen to support same-sex
marriage and have questioned the Essential of gender dimorphism that
makes it unavailable to American couples, but my parsimony-andtransparency thesis does not demand that this Essential go away. Instead,
this Article would put Essentials of Marriage, including this one, to an
Audi-Rawls test, urging inquiry into how these barriers function in a legal
regime that aspires to political liberalism. Inasmuch as their proponents can
defend them and the state can make their content transparent to affected
individuals, Essentials-even ones that would not have emerged but for
coverture or religious beliefs--can coexist with public reason.
C. They Do Not Comport with Decisional Law Interpreting Constitutional
Provisions
Although most of the Essentials of Marriage do not take form as text,
they do have the force of law. For purposes of analysis they may be
grouped with statutes and regulations that have been challenged as
unconstitutional, even though a court cannot invalidate them using judicial
review. As a thought experiment, then, let us consider what would happen
to the Essentials of Marriage if they were to take form in state statutes that
go on to be challenged in court." 4 Section 3 of the federal DOMA gives an
example of such codification: "[T]he word 'marriage' means only a legal
'
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife."275
Other Essentials catalogued in Part I of this Article-including the
duty to support one's spouse, the related duty to render services to one's
spouse, and an entitlement to ongoing sexual intimacy-could, with relative
ease, be written into statutes. The Essential providing that a husband
determines the domicile of his wife by choosing to live in a particular state
is exceptionally easy to codify in our thought experiment: "The domicile of
a married woman is that of her husband," we might decree. To codify the
Essential of perdurability, we could use section 190 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts as the first draft of a statute providing that any
273.

Rawls, supra note 264, at 780.

274. One scholar made a related argument that returning to a common law of
crimes-prohibitions written by judges rather than legislatures-would have parsimonious
and transparent effects. William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100
MICH. L. REv. 505, 588-91 (2001). Aware that this return cannot occur, Stuntz proposed
constitutional rules that would permit judges to overturn crimes when the prohibitions fall
short in parsimony and transparency. Id. at 588-91.
275. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, sec. 3.
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contract or agreement that has the effect of encouraging divorce is
unenforceable in the courts of the state.276 For our thought experiment, we
apply the United States Constitution to these Essentials.
1. The Equal ProtectionClause

Several Essentials impose constraints on individuals based on their sex
or gender. Assuming that hombook equal protection doctrine governs the
constitutionality of these Essentials, and that a claimant would allege that
the Essential as codified is unconstitutional because it discriminates against
him or her on the basis of sex, a court would apply the standard of review
known as intermediate scrutiny. "To withstand intermediate scrutiny under
an equal protection analysis," according to an encyclopedia, "a statutory
classification must be substantially related to an important governmental
'
objective."277

What constitutes an important governmental objective, and which sexbased classifications flunk this test for constitutionality? Intermediatescrutiny decisional law by the Supreme Court manifests what David Strauss
has called a "modernizing" inclination.278 The Court has a governmental
objective of its own, Strauss argues. It works against attitudes toward sexbased classifications that now are, or seem, archaic.279 This stance holds
that a legislature may not pursue the entrenchment of regressive positions
on gender. Rearguard objectives might be "important" to the writers of
these laws, or central to a conservative position on sex roles, but to the
Other
Court they weigh against the constitutionality of the statute.2"'
commentators of varied political views share Strauss's assessment of how

276. See supra note 96. The Uniform Commercial Code offers a precedent for this
kind of statute. Numerous provisions in the model statute recognize broad precepts, and
jurisdictions that adopted the UCC kept them rather than deleted them as too vague. I thank
Neil Cohen for his discussion of this point with me.
277. 16B AM. JUR. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 861 (2009).
278. David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 859, 859 (2009).
279. Id.at 874.
280. In the 1970s, for example, the Court struck down laws "that presumed that
widows, but not widowers, were dependent on the earnings of their deceased spouses." Id. at
871 (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) and Weinberger v. Wissenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975)). Congress could have been trying to address real dependency through the
use of a proxy that saves administrative cost. Id.at 876. Whether one shares this goal or not,
it is cogent. And yet it failed intermediate scrutiny. Strauss also notes that the Court has
used the Equal Protection clause to strike down statutes that rested on "statistically valid
generalizations." Id. at 870-71. Similarly, instances of sex segregation have had divergent
fates in the Supreme Court based on whether the Justices believed that the challenged action
originated in a modem or an archaic use of this segregation. Id.at 873 (discussing United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
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the Supreme Court has used its intermediate-scrutiny tier of review."'
Applied to the Essential that had bestowed on husbands the prerogative to
choose their wives' domicile, this "modernizing" use of equal protection
doctrine has brought about an invalidation.2 2 Judicial decisions finding a
wifely duty to render services are also inconsistent with a genderprogressive approach to equal protection.283
Essentials of Marriage that impose gender dimorphism-in particular,
denials of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and invalidations of
marriages involving a trarisgendered spouse 2 4-would fare equally poorly
under Strauss's "modernizing judicial review."2 5 The Supreme Court has
not yet ruled on which tier of scrutiny must be used to examine claims of
sexual-orientation discrimination.286 Some courts have applied rational
basis review, the most difficult tier for claimants to overcome. 2 7 The
Department of Justice has taken a position in favor of "heightened
scrutiny," a term whose meaning is still evolving but that unquestionably
demands more from the state than does rational basis review. 28z According
to the Department, homosexual persons fulfill the criteria announced in
earlier decisional law: they have been subject to discrimination in the past;
they exhibit characteristics that distinguish them as a distinct group; and
they are a minority. 89 Whether our court uses "intermediate scrutiny" or
"heightened scrutiny," it would find it difficult to uphold the Essential that
demands gender dimorphism as a condition for entry into marriage.
281. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §11:3 (3d ed. 2011)
(noting that the Court has upheld classifications aimed at redressing "historical lack of
opportunities "while striking down those based on "traditional stereotypes"); Valorie K.
Vojdik, Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection Doctridfe: Reframing the Exclusion of
Women from Combat, 57 ALA. L. REv. 303, 307 (2005) (criticizing the Court's focus on
stereotypes as insufficiently attentive to gender subordination); Angela M. Biamonte, Note,
The Progressive's View of the Defense of MarriageAct and Its Conflict with Conservative
Society, 4 WIDENER L. SYMp. J. 325, 331 (1999) (celebrating intermediate scrutiny for the
support of women as disempowered people).
282. Samuel v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119, 1131-34 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
283. See supra Section I.B.
284. See supranote 168 and accompanying text.
285. Strauss, supra note 278.
286. See DOJ Letter, supranote 218; Litigating,supra note 2, at 2695.
287. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying rational basis review to a
law that had invalidated protections of homosexual persons); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion applied rational
basis review). Some cases have held that withholding same-sex marriage cannot survive
even rational basis review. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 998-99 (N.D.
Cal. 2010); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1004 (Mass. 2003).
288. DOJ Letter, supra note 218.
289. DOJ Letter, supra note 218 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03
(1987); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985)); see also
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
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2. The Contracts Clause
The United States Constitution provides that "no State shall ... pass
any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. ''29° This provision does
not limit the Essentials of Marriage as now applied, for two reasons that we
can assume away in our thought experiment. First, the Contracts Clause
constrains only state legislation and, as was just noted, very few of the
Essentials have been codified. Second, the Supreme Court has held that
"marriage is not a contract within the meaning of the [Contract Clause]
prohibition. ' 29 ' If the Essentials of Marriage that limit marital contracting
were written into state statutes, and if courts were willing to apply the
Contracts Clause to marriage formation and marital agreements, would
these Essentials statutes violate the Contracts Clause?
Two judge-made questions create hurdles for any claim of
unconstitutionality under the Contracts Clause. First, the contract-related
Essentials barrier must be big enough: a trivial impairment to spousal
contracting will not invalidate the Essential.292 Second, an impairment does
not violate the Contracts Clause if it is necessary to serve "an important
'
public purpose."293
Because one premise of this Article is that the Essentials
of Marriage are important, we can pass over the first hurdle and move to the
more difficult challenge of the second. The idea of marriage as Status
implies that individuals who marry must not be left to their own devices,
which include their own transactions. In Contracts Clause decisional law,

courts have insisted that the state has a stake in marital arrangements 94
That stake needs to be articulated. 95 Several Essentials may affront
the Contracts Clause as courts have interpreted it: the perdurability
290. U.S. CoNsT., art. I. § 10.
291. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210 (1888).
292. Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina v. City of Rock Hill, 501 F.3d 368 (4th
Cir. 2007) (imposing a "substantial impairment" criterion); United Teachers of New Orleans
v. State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 985 So.2d 184 (La. App. 2008) (requiring
that the impairment be "of constitutional dimension").
293. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977); Retired Emp.
Ass'n of Orange County v. County of Orange, 610 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2010);
Hageland Aviation Serv. v. Harms, 210 P.3d 444, 453 (Alaska 2009).
294. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211; In re Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845, 850 (Colo.
1975) ("marriage is not a 'contract' within the meaning of the contract clause of the
constitution"); Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 1857 WL 3556, at *8(1857) ("as between husband
and wife, there is no constitutional provision protecting the marriage itself, or the property
incident to it, from legislative control, by general law, upon such terms as public policy may
dictate"); see also supra notes 82-85 (discussing Van Koven v. Van Koven, a case that did not
advert to the Contracts Clause, in which the court described the state as a party to all
contracts between husbands and wives).
295. See generally Calef v. West, 652 N.W. 2d 496, 501 (Mich. App. 2002) (noting
"'the well-settled rule that where freedom of contract and declared public policy are in
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Essential, which has invalidated contracts to the detriment of women;296 the
duty to render services, which has had the same effect;297 and the ban on
attorneys' fees contingent on the outcome of a divorce, an agreement that
both parties to the retainer agreement might want. 298 To the extent it
functions to impede contracting between husbands and wives,299 the duty of
support is suspect as well. High time, I would contend, for whatever
"important public purpose[s]" invalidate agreements between spouses to
emerge for discussion, rather than simply be presumed. Applied to the
Essentials of Marriage, a Contracts Clause analysis would force states to
give reasons for the impairments they impose on marital contracting.
Constitutional challenges to the Essential of gender dimorphism
provide a precedent. They forced lawyers representing various states to
give reasons for the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, a
pressure that enhanced public debate of the issue.3"0 It would be useful to
learn why judges invalidate or prohibit some contracts related to marriage
while honoring others."' Important public purposes, now shadowy, ought
to come to the fore.
IV. TOWARD MORE PARSIMONY AND TRANSPARENCY

In this Part, which focuses on the task of amelioration, the working
definition of an Essential of Marriage is a state-imposed condition that
limits the freedom of one or more parties to a marriage or prospective
marriage. Essentials of Marriage include impediments to obtaining a
marriage license, refusals to enforce provisions in contracts between
spouses, and disabilities or barriers imposed on individuals based on their
marital status rather than their conduct. The parsimony project urges states
to keep these impediments to a minimum; the transparency project urges
public disclosure of the Essentials that remain present.

conflict, the former necessarily must yield to the latter") (quoting Feldman v. Stein Bldg. &
Lumber Co., 148 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Mich. App. 1967)) (emphasis added).
296. See supra Section I.C.
297. See supra Section I.A.
298. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Section I.B.
300. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961-62 (Mass.
2003) (reviewing the state's arguments for denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples);
Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 414-15 (Conn. 2008) (summarizing the
state's arguments that civil unions would fulfill the plaintiffs' rights under the Connecticut
constitution).
301. See supra notes 100-18 and accompanying text (noting contradictory judicial
stances regarding the enforcement of antenuptial contracts).
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A. Parsimony: Fewer Essentials
What is marriage for?" 2 "The central purpose of modem marriage,"
according to Marjorie Maguire Schultz, "is increasingly recognized to be
the freedom of the individual."3 3 Should this priority appear misplaced, one
must consider what else marriage might be for. Schultz lists "religion,
community, family, economic necessity, and tradition" as the five rivals to
individual freedom, and deems them obsolete: marriages no longer function
as units of economic production, and governments have increased their
reach into the rearing and education of children."
Legal and socioeconomic changes that brought more married women into the workforce
and gave them more control over childbearing made marriage more of a
locus of individualism in the late twentieth century, and these developments
continue. Accordingly, Schultz concludes, the law of marriage ought to
recognize "private choice," spousal agreements, and negotiation aimed at
increasing the fulfillment of spouses as individuals.3"5 Accepting this
framework, I offer a sketch of parsimony in the law of marriage.
1. The Reasonfor Parsimony: Freedomfrom UnjustifiedInterference
As we have seen, the law has moved considerably in the direction that
Schultz recommends. Model statutes encourage planning, negotiation, and
contracting within marriage. 6 Reviewing the family-law landscape in
1992, Jana Singer found what she called privatization: fewer state-enforced
Essentials, more power to make enforceable contracts inter se, more focus
by courts and legislatures on married persons as individuals rather than
constituents of a single unit, and fewer barriers to entry into marriage.3 7
Because same-sex marriage was not available anywhere in the United States
before the onset of DOMA at the federal and state level-while judicial and
legislative reform has made same-sex marriage available in several

302. See E.J. GRAFF, WHAT ISMARRIAGE FOR? (1999); see also Maggie Gallagher,
What is MarriageFor? The Public Purposesof MarriageLaw, 62 LA. L. REV. 773 (2002).
303. Schultz, supra note 94, at 250-5 1.
304. Id. at 251. But see Gallagher, supra note 302, at 787-91 (arguing that because
living with married parents enhances the welfare of children, the legal regulation of marriage
should focus on childrearing).
305. Schultz, supra note 94, at 252-53.
306. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting enthusiastic approval of
separation agreements in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act). Another model statute
provides that couples may form enforceable contracts not only about property but also "any
other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy
or a statute imposing a criminal penalty."
U.L.A. 35 (2001).
307.
Singer, supra note 49.

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a), 9C
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jurisdictions since 2003-the retreat that Singer documented has continued
in this modification of gender dimorphism as an Essential.
This tendency accords with judicial endorsements of parsimony both
in and away from family-law disputes. Upholding a settlement agreement,
the Maryland Court of Appeals wrote that "in the absence of constitutional,
statutory or clear important policy barriers, parties are privileged to make
their own agreement and thus designate the extent of the peace being
purchased."3" 8 A later decision by the Ninth Circuit quoted this passage,
endorsed it in the name of "liberal individualism," and reached a similar
decision to uphold a settlement.3 9 Case law finding antenuptial contracts
and separation agreements valid also makes reference to parsimony as a
limit on state prerogatives to interfere." °
2. The Essentials,Streamlined
The parsimony-and-transparency project concedes the truism that
every legal status contains essentials. Parsimony and the Essentials of
Marriage can coexist. Which Essentials ought to survive, which need to go,
and which new ones might be installed are questions that this Article will
not purport to resolve. I can nominate three Essentials, however, that in my
opinion are worth adding or keeping.
The first Essential of Marriage that I would endorse is what Martha
Fineman has called "the dependency component of the parent-child
relationship." '' By enforcing attention to this condition, a dependency
Essential would invalidate spousal contracts harmful to children. It would
also try to stop the government from treating nonmarital children worse than
marital ones.
My second Essential, a kind of anti-coverture that nevertheless accepts
a role for marriage as a state-sponsored status, rests on work by Linda
308. Bernstein v. Kapneck, 430 A.2d 602, 606 (Md. 1981).
309. Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988). Although both
of these decisions found against individual plaintiffs who had brought personal injury
actions, fidelity to contract does not preclude siding with an economically disadvantaged
litigant. See, e.g., Hodge v. Evans Fin. Corp., 707 F.2d 1566, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(denying summary judgment to an employer on the ground that the provisions of the contract
were not well established: "A basic principle of contract law is the concept of freedom of
contract-the right of the contracting parties to structure their transactions in accordance with
their wishes.").
310. See, e.g., Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E. 2d 955, 962 (Mass. 2010) (noting the
Supreme Judicial Court's "established recognition that a marital relationship need not vitiate
contractual rights between the parties."); Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990)
(decrying as "paternalistic and unwarranted interference" the suggestion that antenuptial
contracts are unenforceable when one of the parties lacked advice of counsel).
311. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, in MARRIAGE
PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 29, 62 (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006).

The "Essentialsof Marriage"

McClain312 and, indirectly, John Rawls. Recall the contention by Rawls that
family law serves the political purpose of building institutions over time." 3
McClain, arguing as did Rawls from premises of political liberalism, has put
forth what might be framed as an Essential: the promotion of equality.
Marital equality includes, inter alia, equality within families and equality
among families." 4 This equality Essential would declare "an important
public purpose"3 5 not previously located among the Essentials, but
amenable to classification with the pursuits of a liberal state.
Perdurability, the third Essential that I would defend, is the only one
of the three already in force.316 Consistent with my criticisms of how courts
interpret and apply this Essential, I hope that judges will in the future deploy perdurability with more care than case law now manifests. Spousal
choices that make marriages easier to exit, as well as actions by outsiders
that undermine a marriage, can be healthy phenomena that this Essential
should not obstruct. No-fault divorce, a force against perdurability, is in my
opinion an almost unmitigated good." 7 The narrow form of this Essential
that I favor functions to distinguish marriage from a less portentous dyadic
relationship. Perdurability should, in my view, make marriage somewhat
harder to exit than mere dating, courtship, cohabitation, or engagement to
marry. Of all the Essentials of Marriage, perdurability appears most
consistent with what individuals-both those who marry and those who
eschew marriage-want for themselves.3"'
B. Transparency: When an Essential Impedes Prerogatives for Individuals,
Make It Clearer
Governments impose Essentials of Marriage onto individuals mainly
via legislation and common law adjudication.319 A concern for transparency
312. LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY,
AND RESPONSIBILITY (2006).
313. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
314. MCCLAIN, supra note 312, at 117-19 (emphasis added).
315. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (summarizing Contracts Clause
jurisprudence).
316. See supra Section I.C.
317. I especially value no-fault divorce for reducing domestic violence, female
suicide rates, and the likelihood that a woman will be murdered by her husband. Les Picker,
Divorce Laws and Family Violence, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, Mar. 2004,
availableat http:/Ibpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Press/Mentions/nberdigestmar04.pdf.
318. 1 thank Bryan Wildenthal for an enlightening conversation on this point.
319. Occasionally other means of foisting Essentials emerge. For example, clerk's
offices relay misinformation about the law of name-changing upon marriage. Elizabeth F.
Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 761, 824 (2007); see also supra note 234 (recounting the decision by a marriage
clerk to invalidate an electronic marriage based on an implicit Essential of geographic
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would strive to make these impositions of state authority known to the
population that they affect. Ideally, individuals would know how the state
can override their wishes before they enter into a new marriage or initiate a
divorce. Because citizens often remain unaware of lawmaking by courts
and legislatures, the transparency project has data-gathering to do.
1. Transparencyas a DesirableandAttainable End
Soon after taking office, President Barack Obama announced a
commitment to transparency, noting that it "promotes accountability and
provides information for citizens about what their Government is doing.""32
How well the Obama administration went on to honor this promise may be
" ' the ideal, however, is unassailable,
debated;32
and can be applied to the
Essentials of Marriage. Like electronic marriage as proposed by Adam
Candeub and Mae Kuykendall, the transparency endeavor would be amply
32
precedented.
Quick examples: federal environmental law is replete with duties to
disclose information to the public.323 Federal and state election laws
demand numerous disclosures from donors, candidates, and political action
committees. 324
Securities law establishes disclosure, a source of
transparency (in principle), as an entitlement for investors.3 25 Because
transparency has been recognized as a right-and-obligation in settings of
comparable importance, and because Essentials of Marriage obstruct what
people want and think they have, the state ought to try to inform individuals
of marriage-related obstructions that are likely to be obscure.326

presence). Referenda opposing same-sex marriage pressed the Essential of one-man-onewoman on individuals resident in California and Maine. Adjudication and legislation
generate and enforce most Essentials, however.
320. Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 15, 4685
(Jan. 21, 2009), availableat http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1777.pdf.
321. See Eric Lichtblau, Report is Critical of Obama's Efforts at Transparency,N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, at A12.
322. See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
323. Memorandum from Lisa Jackson to EPA Employees: Transparency in EPA's
Operations (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/Administrator/operations
memo.html.
324. Thomas H. Dupree, Jr., Exposing the Stealth Candidate: Disclosure Statutes
After McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1211, 1217-18 (1996).
325. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequencesfor Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417 (2003).
326. An analogy might be drawn to the notice requirement of criminal law. See
Stuntz, supra note 274, at 588 ("A necessary condition of any free society is the ability to
avoid going to prison; one has that ability only if one can know what behavior will lead to
prosecution and punishment.").
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2. How to Make the Law of MarriageMore Transparent:Preliminary
Thoughts
Consider the Essential of gender dimorphism as made more
transparent in 1997. When the General Accounting Office, in response to a
request from the House Judiciary Committee, undertook to survey which
laws were affected by the Defense of Marriage Act, it summarized its
methods in a cover letter. The GAO wrote that it "conducted searches for
various words or word stems ("marr," "spouse,". "widow," etc.), chosen to
elicit marital status, in several electronic databases that contain the text of
'
federal laws."327
Next, it winnowed out the false positives-Marrakesh,
bone marrow transplants, proper names containing "marr"--and settled on a
'
count of 1049 federal laws "in which marital status is a factor."328
This reporting could be replicated at the state level by researchers
inside or outside the government. Because marriage is regulated more by
states than the United States government, state codes contain a greater
density of marriage-related terms, but dividing the job by jurisdictions
would permit a variety of providers to complete the survey. Public-policy
nonprofits and bar associations could receive relatively small government
grants to launch a transparency project. Once the Essentials of Marriage
that a state enforces are gathered and put into accessible prose, an
information provider could prepare a pamphlet.32 9
New York offers an example of government-mandated transparency
that other states could emulate. Its legislature revised the standard marriage
license application to inform applicants that the law gives them several
options with respect to their surnames after they marry. This modest reform
suggests that governments could consider mandating the provision of
information about other Essentials of Marriage on these license
applications. Space on forms is finite, to be sure, and information overload
looms atop any initiative to promote transparency.33 ° Yet, if New York (to
date alone among the states) could find space to summarize and
communicate this information,"' then there must be room available for

327.
328.
329.

GAO Report, supra note 219, at 1.
Id.
For an example of this kind of transparency as applied to health privacy, see

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, YOUR HEALTH
INFORMATION PRIVACY RIGHTS, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/under

standing/consumers/consumer rights.pdf.
330. See Paredes, supra note 325, at 417-18 (noting the clutter that disclosure rules
generate).
331. Emens, supra note 319, at 842.
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governments to provide more transparency about the Essentials of Marriage
33 2
when new marriages are formed.
CONCLUSION

Courts apply the Essentials of Marriage to individuals in freedomdefeating ways. They have excluded people from the status of being
married, with and without statutory warrant. They have ascribed sexual
entitlements and obligations to the marital relationship, making a priority of
what individuals might have considered petty or peripheral. They have
asserted, with little detail or evidence of reflection, a public policy rationale
for nullifying spousal bargains. In short, they have impeded the choices that
individuals make. Starting with the 1996 enactment of a federal statute that
purported to defend marriage, legislatures have been adding to the
Essentials impediments. In this Article, I have called for a shift: more
parsimony and transparency in the imposition of these Essentials.
Although the parsimony and transparency efforts are distinct and can
be pursued separately, they reinforce each other. Activists working toward
parsimony-minded law reform will start by looking for existent Essentials,
an undertaking that brings these conditions to the fore even when attempts
to eliminate them fail. Transparency, achieved even in part, invites repeal
or modification of the more egregious and arbitrary restrictions on freedom
that investigators will uncover.
The parsimony-and-transparency agenda of this Article eschews
particular substantive outcomes. It can be severed from the merits of
marriage-related doctrines and law reform proposals. Consistent with this
stance, I have tried to be candid about the marriage rules that I favor and
disfavor while also emphasizing the unimportance of my opinions.
To underscore this priority, I conclude this Article by relaying a
reform suggestion that I do not endorse yet is perfectly consistent with my
project. Jeffrey Sherman has urged courts to return to the old stance of
refusing to honor antenuptial contracts that provide for the division of
property upon divorce.333 In his view, enforcing these contracts gives
married people an asymmetrical set of privileges. Having chosen to marry,
they ought to accept the detriments as well as the many benefits that attend
' Sherman
this status: "You cannot have 'the perks without the works',"334
writes. Fair enough. His nonenforcement proposal is amenable to
332.

See generally Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U.

MICH. J.L. REF. 217, 255-58 (1990) (praising the state of Louisiana for mandating disclosures
about the economic rights and responsibilities of marriage to persons seeking marriage
licenses).
333. Sherman, supranote 106, at 359-60.
334. Id. at 381.
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transparency-spouses who initiate prenups are a well-counseled lot-and
it also may be understood as parsimonious, because current law already
treats antenuptial contracts as different from ordinary bargains."' Unlike
other Essentials that impede marital contracting, the Essential that Sherman
proposes, which would prevent married persons from acting to protect their
separate property, honors individual choice and does not ambush a couple
with unexpected and unjustified coercion.
Limits on freedom are necessary to human flourishing and civic life,336
but the state ought to impose them with care. Parsimony urges attention to
the coercive effects of an Essential; transparency commends clarity and
accessibility in the content of state-enforced restrictions that individuals
might not be expected to know. Vigilance about both goals with respect to
the Essentials of Marriage enhances liberty for persons who marry or want
to marry, without denying the public interest in a unique status.

335.

See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 50, at 126-27 (describing how courts

add extra scrutiny to these contracts); see also Rasmussen & Stake, supra note 28, at 495
(conceding, in a robust proposal to expand antenuptial contracting, that "choice hurts").
336. See generally Bernstein, supranote 25 (juxtaposing security and freedom).

